





Tentative Interim Amendment

# **NFPA® 130**

## *Standard for Fixed Guideway Transit and Passenger Rail Systems*

### **2020 Edition**

**Reference:** 6.3.3.6, 6.3.3.7, 6.3.3.9. A.6.3.3.5, and A.6.3.3.8 **TIA 20-1**  *(SC 18-4-7 / TIA Log #1354)* 

**Note:** Text of the TIA was issued and approved for incorporation into the document prior to printing.

*1. Revise 6.3.3.6 to read as follows:*  **6.3.3.6** Guards shall not be required along the trainway side of raised walkways where the bottom of the trainway is closed by a deck or grating.

- *2. Revise 6.3.3.7 to read as follows:*  **6.3.3.7** Guards shall not be required on raised walkways that are located between two trainways.
- *3. Revise 6.3.3.9 to read as follows:*

**6.3.3.9** Raised Wwalkways that are greater than 1120 mm (44 in.) wide and located between two trainways shall not be required to have a handrail.

#### *4. Revise A.6.3.3.5 to read as follows:*

**A.6.3.3.5** It is important that guards be configured so that they do not interfere with either the vehicle dynamic envelope or with egress from the train onto the walkway. For that reason, guards are not required on the trainway side of raised walkways, provided that the bottom of the trainway is closed by deck or grating so that persons could not fall through the bottom of the guideway.

*5. Revise A.6.3.3.8 to read as follows:* 

**A.6.3.3.8** It is important that handrails be configured so that they do not interfere with either the vehicle dynamic envelope or with egress from the train onto the walkway. For that reason, handrails are not required on the trainway side of raised walkways. Likewise, raised walkways located between trainways are not required to have handrails, provided they are a minimum width of 1120 mm (44 in.).

**Issue Date:** August 6, 2019

**Effective Date:** August 26, 2019

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#### **Committee Statement**

**Resolution:** The reference to NFPA 2 is unnecessary in the current standard.





#### **Committee Statement**

**Resolution:** FR-76-NFPA 130-2020 **Statement:** Reference Updates to Chapter 2



Public Input No. 126-NFPA 130-2020 [Section No. 12.5]

#### **Submitter Information Verification**

**Submitter Full Name:** Kelly Nicolello **Organization:** UL LLC **Street Address: City: State: Zip: Submittal Date:** Tue Jun 16 12:16:57 EDT 2020 **Committee:** FKT-AAA

#### **Committee Statement**

**Resolution:** FR-76-NFPA 130-2020 **Statement:** Reference Updates to Chapter 2







**Statement:** This revision supports other revisions in Chapters 1, 3 and 5 to include requirements for Stops within the scope of the standard







**Resolution:** FR-18-NFPA 130-2020

**Statement:** Proposed revisions are necessary to clarify which occupancies these definitions are intended to address. The revisions support better application of requirements in Chapter 5.





#### **Submitter Information Verification**

**Submitter Full Name:** Gary English **Organization:** Underground Command And Safety







# **Public Input No. 167-NFPA 130-2020 [ Section No. 3.3.57 ] 3.3.57\*** Station. A place designated for the purpose of loading and unloading passengers, including patron service areas and ancillary spaces associated with the same structure. **3.3.57.1\*** Enclosed Station. A station or portion thereof that does not meet the definition of an open station. **3.3.57.2\*** Open Station. A station that is constructed such that it is directly open to the atmosphere and smoke and heat are allowed to disperse directly into the atmosphere. **A.3.3.57** The term station refers to a structure having walls or other barriers that separate the area within the station from the surrounding area and that restrict passenger movement in and out of the station. **Statement of Problem and Substantiation for Public Input** Proposed revisions are necessary to address application of NFPA 130 to Passenger Rail and Light Rail Transit Systems. Existing requirements do not adequately address differences in those systems

from typical rapid transit systems relative to fire-life safety hazards. Refer to related proposed revisions to 1.1.3, A.1.1.3, new definition for "stop" and associated annex language, proposed new sections 5.6 and 5.7, and proposed new sections 6.6 and 6.7.

#### **Related Public Inputs for This Document**

#### **Related Input Relationship**

Public Input No. 164-NFPA 130-2020 [Section No. 1.1.3] Public Input No. 165-NFPA 130-2020 [New Section after 3.3] Public Input No. 168-NFPA 130-2020 [Section No. 5.1.1] Public Input No. 169-NFPA 130-2020 [Section No. 6.1.1] Public Input No. 166-NFPA 130-2020 [Section No. A.1.1.3(6)] Public Input No. 164-NFPA 130-2020 [Section No. 1.1.3] Public Input No. 165-NFPA 130-2020 [New Section after 3.3] Public Input No. 166-NFPA 130-2020 [Section No. A.1.1.3(6)] Public Input No. 168-NFPA 130-2020 [Section No. 5.1.1] Public Input No. 169-NFPA 130-2020 [Section No. 6.1.1]

#### **Submitter Information Verification**

**Submitter Full Name:** Katherine Fagerlund **Organization:** JENSEN HUGHES Consulting Canad **Street Address: City: State:**

**Zip: Submittal Date:** Tue Jun 30 18:15:55 EDT 2020 **Committee:** FKT-AAA

#### **Committee Statement**

**Resolution:** FR-72-NFPA 130-2020

**Statement:** The revision recognizes that a station is a building as opposed to a place.





#### **Submitter Information Verification**



#### **Committee Statement**

**Resolution:** FR-83-NFPA 130-2020

**Statement:** These revisions are in addition to other revisions in Chapters 1, 3 and 5 to include requirements for Stops within the scope of the standard. The revisions to Chapter 5 are intended to clarify application of NFPA 130 to various 'stop' configurations. Existing requirements do not adequately address differences in the configurations of stops from typical rapid transit systems relative to fire-life safety hazards.





# **Public Input No. 129-NFPA 130-2020 [ Section No. 5.1.2.1 ]**

#### **5.1.2.1**

The requirements in this chapter shall supplement the requirements of the locally adopted (or if not, then applicable) codes for the design and construction of stations.

#### **Statement of Problem and Substantiation for Public Input**

This is a seminal, ground-zero problem with huge repercussions that are not overstated. Use of the word " applicable" allows NFPA 500 to slide in under the radar, when many 'organized' jurisdications enact (i.e. legally adopt) their own local building code. We want to sell NFPA 5000, but we first should respect a sovereign jurisdiction's decision when it adopts its own local building code. The local building code hopefully has guidance tuned to local climate, construction practices and risk tolerance which is not possible or even envisioned by NFPA 5000, or any other building code imported 100% from a foreign nation. Witness the confusion overseas where NFPA is trying to sell NFPA 5000, tyro designers try to use NFPA 5000 as the locally " applicable" code, only to get told by offcials years into a Metro project, " should we not be following our own government ordained, decreed, funded and authorized Building Code? Should we not be following our own Building Code that we have so much confidence in, we patronized an updated revision for?" It is one thing to sell Building Codes, but it is going a bridge too far to leave even the faintest doubt in a designer or AHJs mind, that they can use an 'applicable code' other than their locally adopted building code. There are no unique features in the NFPA 5000 or NFPA 101 that make it particularly suited for station design. In fact, NFPA 101 is particularly ill suited, due to its focus on life and not property safety. And sending user to NFPA 220, is a punishment not befitting an organization so respected as the NFPA. To its discredit, the USA does not set the example with this NFPA 130 and local building code interface; but we should. The local building code is the IBC, but it has not stepped up and owned its responsibility. Chris.Reeves@iccsafe.org has rejected my question three times--as to the purpose of Section 405.1.E3. Why does IBC clearly reject liability for design of stations deeper than 9.1 m, but IBC is not standing up and admitting that it retains responsibility for design of stations shallower than 9.1 m? This line in the sand at 9.1 meters deep, is an irresponsibly unresolved interface; NFPA and ICCsafe need work it out-- together. It is costing taxpayers millions in inefficiency and confusion (one simple example, 'how to interface tunnel safety systems between a DUS [ICC won't touch DUS design due to Section 405.1E3] and an At-Grade station where IBC without a doubt--is legally bound and retains responsibility in black-and-white of Section 405.1 since it is shallower than 9.1 m]? Resolving this interface will save person-months of design time in many disciplines, not just fire. I have asked oldtimers with the BOCA to help me understand why BOCA retained design responsibility for stations shallower than 9.1 m; it is obvious why BOCA does not want the increased liability for deep stations-- in light of the purposefully framed obsfucation in NFPA 130 sprinkler guidance. Slowly, the old timers are dying. I asked <wayne.jewell@greenoaktwp.com> an old-time building code official to help with this problem, and he said he would get around to it. Our contact in that 'tuit, has since died. Time slips by and this interface gap sucks up time and money like a black hole. I know why code consultants don't want to fix this gap... 'chaos creates cash.' Enough cash has been createed. It is time to organize, not pilfer from the taxpayers more. If NFPA 130 and ICC would get together and harmonize their respective guidance on this issue of locally ''adopted' building code, you will be doing the sustainable thing, which is not to waste precious resources. And, a more organized design guide will help NFPA sell more subordinate standards, planet-wide. IBC is a great Building Code, there is nothing in it (as Chris.Reeves@iccsafe.org claims) that makes IBC or any other Building Code for that matter, inherently unsuited to the unique environment of Metro stations. If a Building Code were illsuited for station design, why would NFPA 130 finally agree that the major responsibility for station design IS the local code, after trying to do the bulk of the station design guidance by itself for 20 years? And legally, though it was not admitted, but legally IBC retains design responsibility unquestionably for design of all Metro property higher than 9.1 m underground (except where NFPA 130 guidance is more specific, and even then, in the instance of conflict with the IBC, IBC retains the option of deciding in case of conflict). NFPA 130 and ICC need to harmonize this interface gap

because inefficiencies on projects costing tens of billions of dollars, are not what responsible organizations like NFPA or ICCsafe should be noted for.

#### **Submitter Information Verification**

**Submitter Full Name:** Scot Deal **Organization:** Excelsior Fire Engineering **Street Address: City: State: Zip: Submittal Date:** Tue Jun 30 11:25:36 EDT 2020 **Committee:** FKT-AAA

#### **Committee Statement**

**Resolution:** This concept is already addressed in the Disclaimer section of the Standard.




**Resolution:** FR-85-NFPA 130-2020

**Statement:** Revisions made to relocate and augment existing text from 5.2.3 to 4.7 to indicate that the existing requirement is intended to apply for more than just vent and fan shafts as currently prescribed in the referenced Section 5.2.3. Refer also to related changes in Sections 6.2.3 and 7.6.



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**Committee:** FKT-AAA

**Committee Statement**

**Resolution:** FR-2-NFPA 130-2020

**Statement:** Proposed change is consistent with NFPA 101 convention to allow equivalent testing.



# **Committee Statement**

**Resolution:** This concept is already captured in A.4.2.1. The standard should remain predicated on noncombustible construction.



















## **Committee Statement**

**Resolution:** The proposed language is not relevant to Section 5.3.2.5 in that it provides no direction regarding the calculations that are used to determine platform occupant load. With regard to the suggestion for a plaque memorializing certain design parameters, this information would typically be included in design documentation and reporting, which can be retrieved by owners and AHJs if and when required







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extend the whole length of the platform where the ability to egress from any train stopping location can be demonstrated. Door opening force updated as per global change to synchronize with NFPA 101 requirements.

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**Resolution:** Public circulation areas and trainways do not need to be sprinklered as clarified in sections 5.4.4.1 and A.5.4.4.1



#### **5.4.4.1\***

An automatic sprinkler protection system shall be provided in all areas of stations used for concessions, in storage areas, in trash rooms, and other similar areas with combustible loadings, except trainways. per NFPA 13 including the trainways.

#### **Statement of Problem and Substantiation for Public Input**

NFPA prescribes sprinklers in all areas except in nonpublic areas with no combustible loads. Fire sprinklers are already required in all areas of the station where there is a combustible load, except the public areas. Therefore the fire sprinkler supply water, most valves and controls are already required. Lack of fire sprinklers in public areas discounts the probability of a fire occurring in materials brought into the station. The public areas combustible load can be significant with baggage, baby carriages, backpacks, etc. many of which are hydrocarbon based and therefore burn readily. NFPA 13 does not require under carriage sprinklers which would need to be addressed elsewhere in 130. Also, rail agencies generally specify that, where possible, a burning train shall be moved from a tunnel into a station or open air to allow safest evacuation. Without sprinklers in underground stations, the arriving train could present a significant fire and ignite carried on combustibles. Fire sprinklers above trainways would usually prevent extension of fire between exterior of cars and platform combustibles from catching fire. Note a burning train could arrive at the station without warning to the waiting passengers (crush load?) on the platform and their luggage. A deluge type system located above the trainway in stations could be remotely activated before arrival of the burning train which would need coordination with evacuation messages. NFPA 13 does not specify under train sprinklers. This language would not trigger retroactive requirements.

#### **Submitter Information Verification**



### **Committee Statement**

**Resolution:** The committee does not agree with the proposal. Public circulation areas and trainways do not need to be sprinklered as clarified in sections 5.4.4.1 and A.5.4.4.1.












**Related Input Relationship** Public Input No. 164-NFPA 130-2020 [Section No. 1.1.3]











level of protection in consideration of the tunnel as a "means of egress" from a train fire in the tunnel. The substantiation also included a performance criteria for combustible materials based on the performance requirements permitted for combustibles on trains. The Committee accepted the change, in part, keeping the general requirements, but not keeping the performance criteria. This is explained in the Committee Statement as follows,"The fire safety performance submitted in the original proposal was eliminated due to lack of justification in applying vehicle component test criteria to tunnel construction and components. The proposed change provides criteria to evaluate impact of the components on the fire safety of combustible components not currently addressed ... "

It can be inferred from the documentation that the concern with the combustible components was primarily intended to address enclosed trainways (i.e., tunnels) addressing the risks of egress associated with the tunnel. However, in the 2006/2007 version of the standard, a further change was made that altered its application to all trainways and not just tunnels. The Committee initiative appears to have been intended for renumbering, but the editorial changes altered its application to apply to any trainway component, thereby extending its application to at-grade and elevated trainways. This aspect of the change is not addressed in the Committee documentation,

A final change occurred in the 2014 edition of NFPA 130, where the appendix note for the combustible components paragraph was adopted into the text of the standard and the appendix note was eliminated. The 2017 version of the standard is identical to the 2014 version, as is the 2020 version of NFPA 130 even though it is not being applied to this Project. Therefore, in reviewing the documentation supporting the change to the standard, it can be concluded that:

1. The requirement is intended to allow for the use of non-structural combustible components on elements otherwise required by the standard to be noncombustible.

2. The requirement was originally intended for subway tunnels that are used as a means of egress and therefore pose a risk of exposure to combustible components. Its subsequent application to all trainways, including elevated and at-grade components, appears to be editorial.

Reworking of the requirements is intended to update the context to reflect its application to all trainways, clarify that it is for nonstructural elements, include composite materials, and align performance analysis while separating the criteria.

# **Submitter Information Verification**



### **Committee Statement**

**Resolution:** FR-33-NFPA 130-2020

**Statement:** Proposed revisions to 6.2.5.1 are consistent with earlier editions of NFPA 130, where applicability of these requirements was limited to underground trainways. This revision proposes that most of the language in 6.2.5.1 reverts to existing text as this section needs to address "combustible contents not specifically addressed in this standard". Where an exemption is sought for components that are already addressed in the standard, the provisions of Section 1.4 already permit equivalency based on "sufficient technical data". Revisions to 6.2.5.2 and 6.2.5.3 are consistent with the re-organization intent of PI-105.





# **Committee Statement**

**Resolution:** FR-36-NFPA 130-2020 **Statement:** ASTM E84 and UL 723 are deemed equivalent. The referenced sections are updated accordingly.



# **Public Input No. 101-NFPA 130-2020 [ Section No. 6.3.1.4 ]**

#### **6.3.1.4\***

Within enclosed trainways, the maximum distance between exits shall not exceed  $762 \text{ m}$  244m  $(2500 - ft) 800 ft$ ).

# **Statement of Problem and Substantiation for Public Input**

Recommended change to provide equivalent level of safety between tunnels with and without cross passages. From a safety perspective, requiring a path to safety at 800 feet in tunnels with a cross passage while allowing a distance three times greater in a tunnel without cross passages places passengers at considerably higher risk in the tunnel for the same fire scenario.

For example a realistic example of a tunnel just under 2500 feet, with longitudinal ventilation and a train stopped and unable to move just before exiting the portal. Adding a fire in the rear portion of the train presents the following scenario. Operator would request ventilation towards rear of train (to protect most passengers). Passengers would be directed to evacuate in clean air towards safety of nearby portal, i.e. front of train. However, passengers downstream of the fire may not be able to move past the fire and would be exposed to heat, smoke, toxic gases. They would either wait for rescue or self-evacuate downwind toward the closest exit, in this case the portal, roughly 2000? feet away (distance from rear portion of train to the opposite portal)

At 2000? ft the travel time for the first person evacuating from rear of train and walking in clear air would be just over 16 minutes. (2020 130 5.3.4.4 maximum egress travel speed along...corridors... shall be computed at 37.7m/min (124 ft/,min). However, evacuees will tend to walk in single file along the narrow walkway, meaning they will be moving at speed of the slowest person, so the corridor calculation may be too fast.

Walking in smoke with reduced visibility, exposed to gas and heat, will result in even slower walking speed. Following example provide results from several studies yielding a very slow walking speed in smoke of 40ft/min vs the 124 ft/min., resulting in an expected walking time to portal safety increased time from 16 minutes to roughly 48 minutes. This walking speed in based on following (which is used as an one example of walking in tunnels in smoke.)

#### "Method 3: The representation is done individually

Each individual's walking speed in smoke-free conditions is randomised, and is then assumed to reduce linearly as for method 1 and 2 in smoke. Practically, method 3 means that:

ꞏ Visibility levels > 3 meter: Peoples' walking speed is represented by a randomised value from a normal distribution with mean 1,35 m/s and standard deviation 0,25 m/s (based on Fruin [15]) with minimum and maximum thresholds of 0,85 and 1,85 m/s.

ꞏ Visibility levels ≤ 3 meter: Peoples' walking speed is represented by a relative reduction of 0,34 m/s per meter visibility down to the minimum speed of 0,2 m/s." (40ft / min) (1)

Some individuals will possibly just stop given the distance, possibly difficulty breathing, reduced visibility, or physical limits. This effectively stops the orderly evacuation of everyone following them in single file. Slow or stopped evacuation could result in some individuals moving to the invert (taking the risk of third rail exposure) to evacuate.

For comparison tunnels with cross passages, and assuming a distance of 250 ft evacuation distance to reach a cross passage, the time would be 2 minutes without smoke. Same challenge with slow walkers, reduced visibility exist albeit exposure time would be less.

If the expectation the local fire responders will be able to assist evacuees at those distances, this is incorrect. Firefighters lack the necessary air supply in the air bottles they wear to walk to the train, and safely return. The air supply will last approximately 15-20 minutes while walking. This would allow them to walk from the either portal to reach evacuees who need assistance, but their air supply would be inadequate to perform search and perform rescues.

For firefighters, the lack of air supply could be addressed by installing Firefighter Air Replenishment System (FARS) now required in some high rise buildings. However this is NOT available for evacuees.

(1) "WALKING SPEED IN SMOKE: REPRESENTATION IN LIFE SAFETY" Karl Fridolf, WSP Sverige AB

# **Submitter Information Verification**



# **Committee Statement**

**Resolution:** FR-38-NFPA 130-2020 **Statement:** The Revisions introduces a recommendation to consider the emergency response capabilities. Research is planned to evaluate fire fighter capabilities and consideration of exit spacing and reconciliation of travel distance requirements.



#### **6.3.2.1\***

The means of egress within the trainway shall be provided with an unobstructed clear width graduating from 610 mm  $(24 \text{ in.})$  from  $610 \text{ mm}$  $(24 \text{ inches})$  914 mm  $(36)$  at the walking surface to 760 mm 760mm ( 30 in.) at 1575 mm (62 in. 30 inches) 1067 mm (42 inches) at 1575 mm  $(62)$  above the walking surface to 430 mm (17 in.) at 2025 mm (80 in. walkway surface to 430 mm (17 inches) 737mm (29 inches) at 2025mm 2032 mm (80") above the walking surface.

# **Statement of Problem and Substantiation for Public Input**

Current language at 24" is a very narrow pathway and is not allowed for public egress in any adopted standards (NFPA 101, IBC, etc., other than staff access to utility equipment) The proposed increase partially addresses the larger physical size of today's population than earlier Fruin analysis. The 36" walkway width would allow some people to squeeze past each other which might occur when someone is walking slowly, thus improving egress times. In addition the emergency gurneys used to evacuate passengers who cannot walk, has a wheel width of 23". The 24" width allows the gurney wheels to readily fall off the walkway. For very large patients who cannot fit on a gurney, a low friction 'solid membrane' flexible skid with handles is used. The wider width would make it possible to move most people at the walkway width on this skid. 36" is allowed in some new construction under NFPA 101. IF this is adopted, corresponding changes in Annex 6.3.2.1 would be necessary.

# **Submitter Information Verification**



# **Committee Statement**

**Resolution:** Recommend further research to substantiate any change to passenger clearance envelope sizing. Research statement to be developed.



**Zip: Committee:** FKT-AAA

**Submittal Date:** Tue Jun 30 16:14:33 EDT 2020

# **Committee Statement**

**Resolution:** FR-39-NFPA 130-2020 **Statement:** Re-organization of sections to provide clarity.

# **Public Input No. 28-NFPA 130-2019 [ Sections 6.3.3.5, 6.3.3.6, 6.3.3.7, 6.3.3.8, 6.3.3.9 ] Sections 6.3.3.5, 6.3.3.6, 6.3.3.7, 6.3.3.8, 6.3.3.9 6.3.3.5\*** Walkways that are more than 760 mm (30 in.) above the floor or grade below shall be provided with a continuous guard, in accordance with NFPA 101 Chapter 7 except as modified herein, to prevent falls over the open side. The guard shall provide consist of a continious handrail along the side opposite of the trainway. **6.3.3.6** Guards shall not be required along the trainway side of walkways where the bottom of the trainway is closed by a deck or grating. **6.3.3.7** Guards shall not be required on walkways that are located between two trainways. **6.3.3.8\*** Walkways that are more than 760 mm (30 in.) above the floor or grade below shall be provided with a continuous handrail along the side opposite the trainway. **6.3.3.9** Walkways that are greater than 1120 mm (44 in.) wide and located between two trainways shall not be required to have a handrail. **Statement of Problem and Substantiation for Public Input** This change serves to send the designer to NFPA 101 for guard requirements. As it stands, the code requires a guard however does not state how the guard should be designed and the height. requirement of the guard. In addition, the handrail clause of 6.3.3.8 is merged within the edit, as this information is duplication and could lead to confusion within an environment where NFPA 101 is not applied. **Submitter Information Verification Submitter Full Name:** Daniel Ford **Organization:** WSP Middle East **Street Address: City: State: Zip: Submittal Date:** Thu Nov 21 09:38:16 EST 2019 **Committee:** FKT-AAA **Committee Statement Resolution:** Reference to 101 is broad and does not provide specific guidance.



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**Submitter Full Name:** Katherine Fagerlund









# **Committee Statement**

**Resolution:** Not all access points are gates.

#### 6.4 Fire Protection and Life Safety Systems. insert "emergency"

#### 6.4.1 Emergency Access.

6.4.1.1 Except as described herein, means of egress and exits from the guideway shall serve as emergency access routes.

6.4.1.2 If security fences are used along the trainway, access gates shall be provided in security fences, as deemed necessary by the authority having jurisdiction.

6.4.1.3 Access gates shall be a minimum 1120 mm (44 in.) wide and shall be of the hinged or sliding type.

**6.4.1.4 Access gates shall be placed as close as practicable to** the portals to permit easy access to enclosed trainways.

**6.4.1.5** Information that clearly identifies the route and location of each gate shall be provided on the gates or adjacent thereto.

**6.4.1.6** Access to the elevated trainway shall be from stations or by mobile ladder equipment from roadways adjacent to the trackway.

**6.4.1.7** If no adjacent or crossing roadways exist for the elevated trainway, access roads at a maximum of 762 m (2500 ft) intervals shall be required.

6.4.1.8 Where the configuration of an open-cut trainway prevents or impedes access for firefighting, provisions shall be made to permit fire fighter access to that section of trainway at intervals not exceeding 762 m (2500 ft).

#### 6.4.2 Blue Light Stations.

 $6.4.2.1*$  Blue light stations shall be provided at the following locations:

- (1) At the ends of station platforms
- (2) At cross-passageways
- (3) At emergency access points gates
- (4) At traction power substations
- (5) In enclosed trainways as approved

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# **Public Input No. 36-NFPA 130-2019 [ Section No. 6.4.5 ]**

**6.4.5** Standpipe and Hose Systems.

#### **6.4.5.1**

An approved fire standpipe system shall be provided in enclosed trainways where physical factors prevent or impede access to the water supply or fire apparatus, where required by the authority having jurisdiction.

#### 6.4.5.2

A fire standpipe system is not required in open trainways.

#### **6.4.5.3 \***

Class I standpipe systems shall be installed in enclosed trainways in accordance with NFPA 14 except as modified herein.

#### **6.4.5.3 4**

Standpipe systems shall not be required to be enclosed in fire-rated construction, provided the following conditions are met:

- (1) The system is cross-connected or fed from two locations.
- (2) Isolation valves are installed not more than 244 m (800 ft) apart.

#### **6.4.5.4 5**

Standpipes shall be permitted to be of the dry type with the approval of the authority having jurisdiction provided the following conditions are met:

- (1) \* Standpipes shall be installed so that the water is delivered to all hose connections on that standpipe in 10 minutes or less.
- (2) Combination air relief–vacuum valves shall be installed at each high point on the standpipe.

#### **6.4.5.5 6**

Standpipe systems shall be provided with an approved water supply capable of supplying the system demand for a minimum of 1 hour.

#### **6.4.5.6 7**

Acceptable water supplies shall include the following:

- (1) Municipal or privately owned waterworks systems that have adequate pressure, flow rate, and level of integrity
- (2) Automatic or manually controlled fire pumps that are connected to water source
- (3) Pressure-type or gravity-type storage tanks that are installed in accordance with NFPA 22

#### **6.4.5.7 8**

Identification numbers and letters conforming to the system sectional identification numbers and letters shall be provided at each surface fire department connection and at each hose valve on the standpipe lines.

#### **6.4.5.8 9**

Identifying signs shall be affixed to enclosed trainway walls at each hose outlet valve or shall be painted directly on the standpipe in white letters next to each hose outlet valve.

#### **6.4.5.9 10**

Exposed standpipe lines and identification signs shall be painted as required by the authority having jurisdiction.

#### **6.4.5.10 11**

A fire department access road shall extend to within 30.5 m (100 ft) of the fire department connection.

# **Statement of Problem and Substantiation for Public Input**

This proposed change highlights that a fire standpipe is not required for non enclosed trainways.

# **Submitter Information Verification**

**Submitter Full Name:** Daniel Ford **Organization:** WSP Middle East **Street Address: City: State: Zip: Submittal Date:** Mon Dec 09 04:41:54 EST 2019 **Committee:** FKT-AAA

### **Committee Statement**

**Resolution:** FR-43-NFPA 130-2020 **Statement:** Clarification of potential applicability of standpipes to open trainways.






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**Street Address:**

**City: State:**



# **Committee Statement**

**Resolution:** FR-87-NFPA 130-2020

**Statement:** Proposed revisions relocating and augmenting existing text from 5.2.3 to 4.7 are necessary to indicate that the existing requirement is intended to apply for more than just vent and fan shafts as currently prescribed in the referenced Section 5.2.3, make reference to them from other Chapters and to combine them with other related design requirements. Refer also to related changes in Sections 5.2.3 and 6.2.3.

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reference to them from other Chapters and to combine them with other related design requirements. Refer also to related changes in Sections 5.2.3 and 6.2.3.





The test procedures and minimum performance for materials and assemblies shall be as detailed in Table 8.4.1.

Table 8.4.1 Fire Test Procedures and Performance Criteria for Materials and Assemblies







Testing of a complete seat assembly (including cushions, fabric layers, and upholstery) according to ASTM E1537 using the pass/fail criteria of California Technical Bulletin 133 and testing of a complete mattress assembly (including foam and ticking) according to ASTM E1590 using the pass/fail criteria of California Technical Bulletin 129 shall be permitted in lieu of the test methods prescribed herein, provided the assembly component units remain unchanged or new (replacement) assembly components possess fire performance properties equivalent to those of the original components tested.

## **8.4.1.3.1**

A fire hazard analysis shall also be conducted that considers the operating environment within which the seat or mattress assembly will be used in relation to the risk of vandalism, puncture, cutting, introduction of additional combustibles, or other acts that potentially expose the individual components of the assemblies to an ignition source.

#### **8.4.1.3.2**

The requirements of 8.4.1.5 through 8.4.1.8 shall be met.

#### **8.4.1.4**

Testing shall be performed without upholstery.

#### **8.4.1.5**

The surface flammability and smoke emission characteristics shall be demonstrated to be permanent after dynamic testing according to ASTM D3574, Test I2 or Test I3, both using Procedure B, except that the test samples shall be a minimum of 150 mm (6 in.)  $\times$  450 mm  $(18 \text{ in.}) \times$  the thickness used in end-use configuration, or multiples thereof. If Test  $I_3$  is used, the size of the indentor described in Section 96.2 of ASTM D3574 shall be modified to accommodate the specified test specimen.

#### **8.4.1.6**

The surface flammability and smoke emission characteristics shall be demonstrated to be permanent by washing, if appropriate, in accordance with the manufacturer's recommended procedure. If a washing procedure is not provided by the manufacturer, the fabric shall be washed in accordance with ASTM E2061, Annex A1.

#### **8.4.1.7**

The surface flammability and smoke emission characteristics shall be demonstrated to be permanent by dry cleaning, if appropriate, according to ASTM D2724.

#### **8.4.1.8**

Materials that cannot be washed or drycleaned shall be so labeled and shall meet the applicable performance criteria after being cleaned as recommended by the manufacturer.

#### **8.4.1.9**

Combustible operational and safety signage shall not be required to meet flame spread or smoke emission requirements if the combustible mass of a single sign does not exceed 500 g

(1.1 lb) and the aggregate area of combustible signage does not exceed 1 ft<sup>2</sup> per foot of car length.

#### **8.4.1.10**

Materials used to fabricate miscellaneous, discontinuous small parts (such as knobs, rollers, fasteners, clips, grommets, and small electrical parts) where the surface area of any individual small part is less than 100 cm<sup>2</sup> (16 in.<sup>2</sup>) in end use configuration and that will not contribute materially to fire growth in end use configuration shall comply with either 8.4.1.10.1 or 8.4.1.10.2.

#### **8.4.1.10.1**

The materials shall be exempt from flammability and smoke emission performance requirements, provided that an appropriate fire hazard analysis is conducted that addresses the location and quantity of the materials used and the vulnerability of the materials to ignition and contribution to flame spread.

#### **8.4.1.10.2**

The materials shall be tested in accordance with ASTM E1354, at an initial test heat flux of 50 kW/m<sup>2</sup> (4.4 Btu/sec·ft<sup>2</sup>) in the horizontal orientation with a retainer frame, and shall meet the performance criteria of a 180-second average heat release rate not exceeding 100 kW/m<sup>2</sup> (8.8 Btu/sec $\cdot$ ft<sup>2</sup>) and a test average smoke extinction area not exceeding 500 m<sup>2</sup>/kg  $(2441.2 ft<sup>2</sup>/lb)$ .

## **8.4.1.11**

Carpeting used as a wall or ceiling covering shall be tested according to ASTM E162 and ASTM E662 and shall meet the respective criteria of  $I_s \le 35$ ,  $D_s$  (1.5)  $\le 100$ , and  $D_s$  (4.0)  $\le 200$ . *(See 8.4.1.1 and 8.4.1.2.)*

#### **8.4.1.12**

If padding is used in the actual installation, floor covering shall be tested with padding in accordance with NFPA 253 or ASTM E648.

#### **8.4.1.13**

Penetrations (ducts, etc.) shall be designed against acting as passageways for fire and smoke, and representative penetrations of each type shall be included as part of test assemblies.

#### **8.4.1.14\***

See 8.5.1.

#### **8.4.1.15\***

Portions of the vehicle body that separate the major ignition source, energy sources, or sources of fuel load from vehicle interiors shall have fire resistance as determined by a fire hazard analysis acceptable to the authority having jurisdiction that addresses the location and quantity of the materials used, as well as vulnerability of the materials to ignition, flame spread, and smoke generation. These portions shall include equipment-carrying portions of a vehicle's roof and the interior structure separating the levels of a bi-level car but do not include a flooring assembly subject to Section 8.5. In those cases, the use of the ASTM E119 test procedure shall not be required.

**8.4.1.16** Testing of Adhesives and Sealants.

#### **8.4.1.16.1**

Adhesives and sealants shall be tested in accordance with both ASTM E162 and ASTM E662 as a composite system, including a substrate, as shown in 8.4.1.16.2 through 8.4.1.16.3, as appropriate.

#### **8.4.1.16.2**

In the absence of a specified assembly or system, or if the adhesive or sealant is used on several different assemblies or systems, adhesives and sealants intended for application to combustible base materials shall comply with 8.4.1.16.2.1 and 8.4.1.16.2.2.

## **8.4.1.16.2.1**

The adhesive shall be applied to the smooth face of 6.4 mm (**<sup>1</sup>** ⁄**4** in.) thick tempered hardboard, nominal density 800 kg/m<sup>3</sup> to 960 kg/m<sup>3</sup> (50 lb/ft<sup>3</sup> to 60 lb/ft<sup>3</sup>), using recommended (or practical) application techniques and coverage rates.

**Relationship** 

#### **8.4.1.16.2.2**

Tests shall also be conducted on the hardboard alone, and these values shall be recorded as supplemental to the measured values for the composite specimen.

#### **8.4.1.16.3**

Adhesives and sealants intended for application to noncombustible substrate materials shall be applied to the smooth face of 6.4 mm (**<sup>1</sup>** ⁄**4** in.) thick inorganic reinforced cement board, nominal density 1762 kg/m<sup>3</sup>  $\pm$  160 kg/m<sup>3</sup> (110 lb/ft<sup>3</sup>  $\pm$  10 lb/ft<sup>3</sup>), using recommended (or practical) application techniques and coverage rates.

# **Statement of Problem and Substantiation for Public Input**

Table 8.4.1 For all materials in table that require ASTM E662 smoke emission testing, add toxicity testing requirement Test Method: IMO FTP Annex 1:Part 2 Performance Requirement: Pass Add note q : qSee 8.4.1.17

## **Related Public Inputs for This Document**



## **Submitter Information Verification**



#### **Committee Statement**

**Resolution:** Toxicity is addressed by smoke production and flame spread. This change would result in utilizing a standard and an acceptance criteria that NFPA NFPA 130 does not have control over.



The test procedures and minimum performance for materials and assemblies shall be as detailed in Table 8.4.1.

Table 8.4.1 Fire Test Procedures and Performance Criteria for Materials and Assemblies







# **Statement of Problem and Substantiation for Public Input**

Analysis performed for the Federal Railroad Administration has shown that the ASTM E162 flame spread index requirement does not screen out all materials that may exhibit accelerated flame spread and potentially flashover when exposed to a plausible fire inside a railcar. This heat release rate requirement was demonstrated to screen out materials that may cause flashover. In addition, the requirement is in line with the EN 45545-2 material flammability requirement for similar materials in HL1/HL2 categories. The ASTM E162 requirement should be kept to ensure no flaming droplets. Technical basis is described in Ref. [1].

[1] Luo, C., Kraft, S., DiDomizio, M., McKinnon, M., Hodges, J., Yazdani, S., and Lattimer, B., "Heat Release Rate Requirements for Railcar Interior Finish," Final Report, Department of Transportation, Federal Railroad Administration, 2018. DOT/FRA/ORD-19/39

# **Submitter Information Verification**







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chamber, albeit with a different burner): ASTM E1995, NFPA 270 and ISO 5659-2. 3. The NFPA 130 standard uses ASTM E662 in combination with either ASTM E162 (for most materials) or ASTM D3675 (for plastics), for flame spread. Neither ASTM E162 nor ASTM D3675 reference that type of hardboard. 4. ASTM E162 does reference "thick tempered hardboard" (without any clarification) for use with "opaque sheet materials up to  $\frac{1}{6}$ -in. (1.6-mm) thickness, and liquid films such as paints, etc. intended for application to combustible base materials" but not for adhesives. ASTM E162 also states that the hardboard shall have a "mean flame spread index of 130 to 180", which indicates that this section has not been updated for many years, since the ASTM E162 standard does not determine flame spread index but a radiant panel index, so that clearly this section of ASTM E162 has been ignored for years. 5. NFPA 130 was revised for the 2020 edition to require the use of the thick tempered hardboard for testing adhesives in accordance with both ASTM E162 and ASTM E662. That was a mistake that is intended to be corrected by this public input. An informal survey of users of adhesives for trains and underground rail vehicles for smoke emission indicates that the actual testing of adhesives is done by applying them to a noncombustible substrate and not using a system. 6. An informal survey of some fire test labs indicates that none use the thick tempered hardboard for testing adhesives. 7. Much more important, tests conducted on two commercial adhesives a commercial hardboard fairly close to the one in the ASTM E662 standard showed that it produces such a large amount of smoke that the smoke generated by the adhesive itself is dwarfed by the smoke from the hardboard (a table is attached). Consequently, the section on testing adhesives needs to be reworded as follows: 1. The specific thick tempered hardboard required needs to be eliminated and the requirement to test adhesives with any type of hardboard needs to be eliminated. 2. Adhesives should simply be tested on the cement board used in the ASTM E662 standard, which is the same board also used in ASTM E162 and ASTM E84. 3. In terms of smoke emission it is very likely that the adhesive will be a small contributor. 4. Adhesives or sealants should be tested as individual materials and not as composite systems because neither ASTM E662 nor ASTM E162 (or ASTM D3675) are fully suited to testing composite systems. Other fire test standards, such as ASTM E1354 would be more suitable for that. The language is proposed to read as follows: 8.4.1.16\* Testing of Adhesives and Sealants. Adhesives and sealants shall be tested in accordance with both ASTM E162 and ASTM E662 by applying the adhesive or sealant to the smooth face of 6.4 mm  $(\frac{1}{4}$  in.) thick inorganic reinforced cement board, nominal density 1762 kg/m3 ± 160 kg/m3 (110 lb/ft3 ± 10 lb/ft3), using recommended (or practical) application techniques and coverage rates. An annex note will be an added PI to explain that this reverts much of the 2002 edition. This analysis brings into question whether other items in the table should clarify that adhesives need to be included and the clear product is floor coverings (carpets) and a parallel PI addresses that. **Related Public Inputs for This Document Related Input Relationship** Public Input No. 72-NFPA 130-2020 [Section No. 8.4.1.12] Public Input No. 73-NFPA 130-2020 [New Section after A.8.4.1.15] **Submitter Information Verification Submitter Full Name:** Marcelo Hirschler **Organization:** GBH International **Street Address: City: State:**



# **Committee Statement**

**Resolution:** FR-59-NFPA 130-2020

**Statement:** It was shown that testing adhesives or sealants on wood was inappropriate as the smoke production from the board impacts the smoke production from the adhesives. Annex added to clarify the change from 2020 to 2023 Edition.



**CEMENT BOARD: 1/4 in USG Durock cement board from USG Company (approx. 62 pcf) HARDBOARD : 1/4 in Wet Process Eucalyptus Hardboard from D&M Lumber Products Co., Inc. (approx. 51 pcf)**







# **Statement of Problem and Substantiation for Public Input**

ASTM E119 and UL 263 are used to determine fire resistance ratings of different assemblies. These standards are referenced throughout NFPA standards and codes such as NFPA 101 and NFPA 5000 wherever fire resistance ratings are required.

UL 1479 is equivalent to ASTM E814 for fire testing penetration fire stops. These standards are referenced throughout NFPA standards and codes such as NFPA 101 and NFPA 5000wherever fire stop ratings are required.

# **Related Public Inputs for This Document**

#### **Related Input Relationship**

Public Input No. 47-NFPA 130-2020 [Section No. 2.3.9] Public Input No. 122-NFPA 130-2020 [Section No. 8.4.1.15] Public Input No. 124-NFPA 130-2020 [Section No. 8.5.3.2] Public Input No. 125-NFPA 130-2020 [Section No. 12.4.4] Public Input No. 126-NFPA 130-2020 [Section No. 12.5]

# **Submitter Information Verification**



## **Committee Statement**

**Resolution:** FR-60-NFPA 130-2020

**Statement:** ASTM E119 and UL 263 are used to determine fire resistance ratings of different assemblies. These standards are referenced throughout NFPA standards and codes such as NFPA 101 and NFPA 5000 wherever fire resistance ratings are required. UL 1479 is equivalent to ASTM E814 for fire testing penetration fire stops. These standards are referenced throughout NFPA standards and codes such as NFPA 101 and NFPA 5000wherever fire stop ratings are required.






















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# **Public Input No. 118-NFPA 130-2020 [ Section No. 10.1.2 ]**

#### **10.1.2**

Emergency voice/alarm communications Emergency communications systems (EVACS ECS ) shall be designed, installed, inspected, tested, and maintained in accordance with *NFPA 72*, except as modified herein.

10.1.2.1 Emergency voice messages, where required by the applicable building code or the system operator, are permitted to be integrated into the notification system signals via other systems (such as the public address system).

10.1.2.2 Where voice messages are required, these should be integrated which provides a means to silence the alarm signals while the voice instructions are being transmitted, and re-activates the alarm signals after a pre-determined period.

### **Statement of Problem and Substantiation for Public Input**

The three design and installation issues that need to be addressed are:

1. Why is voice notification required; and

2. If the standard deems this is the appropriate measure, can this be through other systems such as the public address system.

3. Terminology needs avoid implication of a requirement in other jurisdictions.

The proposed changes are to address the following three design and installation issues:

1. Why is voice notification required;

2. If the standard deems this is the appropriate measure, this should be permitted through other systems such as the public address system; and

3. Terminology needs avoid implication of a requirement.

#1: The standard is not clear on the intent as to why a voice component is required for emergency notification for all station configurations. Whilst voice messages do assist in emergency announcements specifically in complex integrated structures, providing voice notification in an elevated open station where egress points can be clearly identified, and the risk of exposure is lower, would not warrant a voice component. Suitable notification can be achieved through horns and strobes. The determination of the minimum requirement should be by the local building code or the operator. If voice messages are deemed a requirement, this can be supplemented with the public address (which was addressed in the 2014 edition), and requirements in the standard should not imply this is through the fire alarm system. the standard should specify the functional requirement and leave the design engineer to provide that functionality based on the jurisdictional design and installation standards.

#2: The reference to NFPA 72 can be interpreted to imply (moreso in jurisdictions outside of the US) that this required through the fire alarm system. While NFPA 72 provides flexibility in how this may be achieved (such as allowing other systems to interface with the fire alarm system), other fire alarm design standards are not which could result in duplicate speaker systems. The requirements should not impede integration of other systems (such as use of the public address) to achieve the functionality of voice messages whilst still permitting compliance with the local building codes.

#3: Further, terminology stated in the standard such as "emergency voice communication system" are defined terms in other codes and standards which can result in duplicate fire alarm and public address speakers to meet a requirement that wasn't intended to mean dual systems. In the 2014 edition the wording existed that permitted the use of the Public Address system.

The proposed changes are to re-introduce functional requirements that permit other system to provide voice capability, provides flexibility on how this determined, and limits the potential of dual systems being provided.

### **Submitter Information Verification**

**Submitter Full Name:** Andrew Coles

**Organization:** Senez Consulting Ltd. **Street Address: City: State: Zip: Submittal Date:** Tue Jun 30 02:37:55 EDT 2020 **Committee:** FKT-AAA

### **Committee Statement**

**Resolution:** The intent of the proposed change to allow PA systems is already covered by existing text reference to NFPA 72.







### **Committee Statement**

**Resolution:** FR-51-NFPA 130-2020 **Statement:** These sections have been updated to clarify the locations for two-way wired systems.

> A two-way wired emergency services communication system is a local AHJ issue, which needs to be determined by the participating emergency services.







Tentative Interim Amendment

## **NFPA® 130**

### *Standard for Fixed Guideway Transit and Passenger Rail Systems*

### **2020 Edition**

**Reference:** 11.1.2(1) **TIA 20-2**  *(TIA Log #1475)* 

Pursuant to Section 5 of the NFPA *Regulations Governing the Development of NFPA Standards*, the National Fire Protection Association has issued the following Tentative Interim Amendment to NFPA 130, *Standard for Fixed Guideway Transit and Passenger Rail Systems*, 2020 edition. The TIA was processed by the Technical Committee on Fixed Guideway Transit and Passenger Rail Systems, and was issued by the Standards Council on February 20, 2020, with an effective date of March 11, 2020.

A Tentative Interim Amendment is tentative because it has not been processed through the entire standards development procedures. It is interim because it is effective only between editions of the standard. A TIA automatically becomes a public input of the proponent for the next edition of the standard; as such, it then is subject to all of the procedures of the standards development process.

*1. Revise 11.1.2 item (1) to read as follows:* 

**11.1.2 Application.** These systems include the following: (1) Train control (signaling systems) as described in 7.2.4 7.2.5, 8.9.2.3, and in this chapter …

**Issue Date:** February 20, 2020

**Effective Date:** March 11, 2020

**(Note: For further information on NFPA Codes and Standards, please see** www.nfpa.org/docinfo**)**  Copyright © 2020 All Rights Reserved NATIONAL FIRE PROTECTION ASSOCIATION











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The specific requirement in question is, as mentioned previously, Section 12.2.1 which states:

*All wires and cables used shall be listed as being resistant to the spread of fire and shall have reduced smoke emissions, by complying with one of the following:\**

*(1) All wires and cables shall comply with the FT4/IEEE 1202 exposure requirements for cable char height, total smoke released, and peak smoke release rate of ANSI/UL 1685.* 

*(2) Wires and cables listed as having adequate fire-resistant and low-smoke producing characteristics, by having a flame travel distance that does not exceed 1.5 m (5 ft) and generating a maximum peak optical density of smoke of 0.50 and a maximum average optical density of smoke of 0.15 when tested in accordance with NFPA 262, shall be permitted for use instead of the wires and cables specified in item (1).*

\*The applicability of the requirement was revised in subsequent editions (2017 and 2020) to "wires and cables used in enclosed stations and trainways."

Equivalencies may seek relaxation on the smoke release requirements in consideration of cables being run in non-combustible conduits, whether surface-mounted or embedded/encased within concrete.

From a strict requirements traceability context, such equivalency appears to be problematic as, per Section 12.4.2:

*All conductors, except radio antennas, shall be enclosed in their entirety in armor sheaths, conduits, or enclosed raceways, boxes, and cabinets except in ancillary areas.*

Taken together, it would appear that credit or equivalency owing to enclosure in conduit (notwithstanding embedment in concrete) cannot be taken as it is separately a requirement irrespective of the nature of the wire and cable used. However, it can be demonstrated that the intent of the requirement, especially that of Section 12.2.1 has been modified over years of standard development without specific substantiation. Therefore, it will be necessary to review the evolution of Section 12.2.1, 12.4.2, as well as 12.4.4 which states:

*The emergency power, emergency lighting, and emergency communications circuits shall be protected from physical damage by system vehicles or other normal system operations and from fires in the system for at least 1 hour, but not less than the time of tenability, when exposed to fire conditions corresponding to the time-temperature curve in the ASTM E 119 fire resistance test by any of the following:*

*(1) Circuits are embedded in concrete or protected by a fire barrier system in accordance with UL 1724. The cables or conductors shall maintain functionality at the temperature within the embedded conduit or fire barrier system.*

*(2) Circuits are routed outside the underground portion of the system.*

*(3) There is diversity in system routing (such as separate redundant circuits or multiple circuits separated by a fire barrier with a fire resistance rating so that a single fire or emergency event will not lead to a failure of the system).*

*(4) All circuits consist of listed fire-resistive cable systems with a fire resistance rating in accordance with 12.5.*

The reason for the inclusion of Sections 12.4.2 and 12.4.4 is that these address the protection of wires and cables from fire exposure and the requirements for circuit integrity or reliability.

### *Historical Tracing of NFPA 130 Wire and Cable Requirements*

The 2014 edition of NFPA 130 represents the first edition in which the wires and cables requirements were consolidated within a new Chapter 12. The principal motivation in this major re-organization of the standard was to assure consistency across requirements for stations, trainways, and emergency ventilation equipment (note: the application of many such requirements were clarified in the 2017 edition to be limited to enclosed stations and trainways). Aside from the consolidation, little if any substantive changes were made with respect to the statutory requirements for wire and cable in the 2014 edition.

In the development of the 2010 edition, two significant changes were made in the wire and cable requirements. This involved, firstly, the simplification of the testing requirements and criteria to that of the FT4/IEEE 1202 exposure requirements of ANSI/UL 1685 or specific criteria when tested in accordance to *NFPA 262 Standard Method of Test for Flame Travel and Smoke of Wires and Cables for Use in Air-Handling Spaces*. The simplifications involved deletion of reference to Canadian Standard CSA C22.2 to avoid confusion, specifically reference to 'LS' and 'ST1" requirements that had been removed from UL 1685 at the time of development of the 2010 edition. Also, it was acknowledged in the change that reference to UL 1685 carried both flame spread and smoke production criteria, thereby obviating the need for separate criteria within NFPA 130. Secondly, was the change in applicability in stations of the flame spread and smoke production requirements from "wire and cable constructions intended for use in operating train signal circuits, power circuits to emergency lights, and so forth" to "all wires and cables." The change was proposed as a 'simplification' and brought the requirements in stations in line with those that were established in the 2003 edition for tunnels. It will be demonstrated in following sections, that this marked a significant shift in intent in the wire and cable requirements, a shift and expansion in application that was arguably unintended and at least unsubstantiated based on the documentation of the committee proceedings.

The transition from the 2003 to 2007 edition was marked largely by minor editorial changes or corrections to the wordings related to wire and cable flame spread and smoke production requirements. What was added in this edition was alternative methods for the protection of emergency circuits (emergency lighting, communications, and ventilation fans and devices). In prior editions through 2003, "suitable embedment or encasement" or "routing of conductors exterior to the interior underground portions of the transit system facilities" were the only recognized options for the protection of critical emergency circuits. In the 2007 edition, "(d)iversity in system routing…so that a single fire or emergency event…will not lead to a failure

of the system" and "listed fire-resistive cable system(s) with a minimum 1-hour rating" to ANSI/UL 2196 were added as options for critical emergency circuit protection.

The 2003 edition is significant in the development of the wire and cable flame spread and smoke production requirements. Critically, the introduction of UL 1581, CSA 222.2 No. 0.3, UL 1685, and NFPA 262 were a reaction to the pending withdrawal of *IEEE 383* (1974) *Standard for Qualifying Class 1E Electric Cables and Field Splices for Nuclear Power Generating Stations* by IEEE. While it was correct to substitute a current fire test standard for one that was likely to be withdrawn and no longer supported by testing facilities, it is contended that the original intent of the requirement was lost in the update – this will be argued in the following paragraphs. And, because the intent of the requirement with respect to IEEE 383 qualification became obscured, it can also be argued that the smoke production requirements were included as a 'rider' on the new flame spread requirements, rather than as a legitimate fire safety improvement.

Like the 2010 edition, the 2003 edition was marked by a subtle and seemingly innocuous change in the scope of applicability in the wire and cable flame spread (and now smoke requirements). At the 'Report on Proposal' stage of the standard development cycle, the word 'vital' was proposed to be removed and the word 'signal' was proposed to be added to Section 3-2.3.5 to read:

*Wire and cable constructions intended for use in operating vital train circuits and power circuits to emergency signal lights and so forth shall…*

In deleting 'vital', an important descriptor was lost thereby obscuring the intent for the requirement. The addition of the word 'signal' simply resulted in confusion as evidenced by the ballot commentary:

*The addition of the word "signal" makes the requirement less general and could be interpreted to not include other emergency lighting such as that for emergency walkway in underground trainways.*

Consequently, at the comment phase the committee sought to provide clarification with the following wording:

*Wire and cable constructions intended for use in operating vital train circuits and power circuits to emergency lights and so forth shall be listed as being resistant to the spread of fire and shall have reduced smoke emissions.* 

This wording emphasized the application to circuits fundamental to operating the trains and emergency circuits. However, the committee instead re-worded the section more broadly as:

*All wire and cable constructions intended for use in trainways other than traction power cables shall be listed as being resistant to the spread of fire and shall have reduced smoke emissions in accordance with this section.*

with the substantiation that "refer(ring) to all wire in the trainways instead of trying to differentiate between specific wiring for ease in interpretation" was a clarification. As a result, the scope of the requirements was expanded, largely without substantiation, to hopefully eliminate confusion in interpretation of which wire or cable the requirement should apply. However, the broadening of the application can be argued to dilute the intent of the

requirement, which will be clarified in the following sections. In its original form, the application to 'vital' or 'emergency' circuits illustrates that such circuits require a higher degree of protection given their critical function to the operation of the railroad and/or its emergency systems. Therefore, the integrity of the circuits is arguably the more essential performance outcome, not (necessarily) the flame spread characteristics and not the smoke production characteristics. Protection of circuits for their continued operation during a fire event are better addressed in recent NFPA 130 editions through Section 12.4.4 that lists multiple methods for protecting critical power and communications circuits.

Prior to the 2003 edition, there were limited if any changes to the wire and cable requirements. The most significant change came in the 1997 edition which introduced for the first time a dedicated chapter on Emergency Ventilation Systems. Relatedly, the requirements for "vital train circuits, power circuits to emergency lights, and so forth" were effectively copied over to control and power circuits for emergency ventilation fans and devices.

In summary:

- The wire and cable requirements of NFPA 130 were largely unchanged from 1983 through 2000. These will be explored in greater depth in the following section.
- The first major change in requirement originated in the 2003 edition in reaction to the pending withdrawal of IEEE 383-1974.
- The inclusion of smoke production requirements accompanied the changes in 2003 as an accompaniment to the flame spread requirements – rather than in consideration of the original intent of the section.
- Expansions of applicability of the wire and cable were, as interpreted by the reviewer, incrementally done in 2003 and 2010 for enclosed trainways and enclosed stations to 'simplify' interpretation.

The following section will focus on the requirements for wire and cable as originally developed for the 1983 edition of NFPA 130 to illustrate the intent and by which proposed equivalencies ought to be interpreted.

### *Wire and Cable Requirements for Enclosed Transit Facilities*

The requirements for wire and cable and wiring methods are largely encapsulated by four clauses from the 1983 edition of NFPA 130. These include:

2-4.1.1 Materials manufactured for use as conduits, raceways, ducts, boxes, cabinets, equipment enclosures and their surface finish materials shall be capable of being subjected to temperatures up to 932 °F (500 °C) for one hour, and shall not support combustion under the same temperature condition. Other materials when encased in concrete are acceptable.

2-4.1.4 Wire and cable constructions intended for use in operating vital train circuits and power circuits to emergency fans, lights, etc. shall pass the flame-propagating criteria of IEEE Standard 383 and have a minimum short circuit time of five minutes in the IEEE Standard 383 flame test protected in accordance with the requirements of the authority having jurisdiction.

2-4.1.5 All conductors, except radio antennas, shall be enclosed in their entirety in armor sheaths, conduits, or enclosed raceways, boxes, and cabinets. Except in ancillary areas or other nonpublic areas. Conductors in conduits or raceways shall be permitted to be embedded in concrete or run in protected electrical duct banks, but shall not be installed exposed or surface-mounted in air plenums that might carry air at the elevated temperatures accompanying fire emergency conditions.

2-4.1.8 Conductors for emergency lighting, communications, and so forth shall be protected from physical damage by transit vehicles or other normal transit system operations and from fires in the transit system by suitable embedment or encasement, or by routing such conductors external to the interior underground portions of the transit system facilities.

The four clauses above can be grouped: 2-4.1.1 with 2-4.1.5 and 2-4.1.4 with 2-4.1.8. The former two relate to wire installation while the latter two refer to circuit integrity or protection (from physical or thermal damage).

Taking first Clauses 2-4.1.4 and 2-4.1.8, the principle is the criticality and maintenance of the functioning circuit. This is obvious and evident of Clause 2-4.1.8 given the stated objective of the suitable embedment or encasement: protection from physical damage and from fires. However, interpreting Clause 2-4.1.4 in this way requires an understanding of the origins and intent of IEEE 383.

*IEEE 383 Standard for Qualifying Class 1E Electric Cables and Field Splices for Nuclear Power Generating Stations* was largely developed prior to but first published in partial response to the fire at the Brown's Ferry nuclear site. Class 1E cables and equipment are defined in IEEE 308 as:

*The classification of the electric equipment and systems that are essential to emergency reactor shutdown, containment isolation, reactor core cooling, and containment and reactor heat removal or that are otherwise essential in preventing significant release of radioactive material to the environment.* 

Class 1E systems and equipment provide power to systems directly responsible for safety. Qualification for Class 1E duty means that it must be demonstrated that the cables perform their function(s) under postulated design-basis events. These tests include:

- Industry standard tests
	- o UL requirements
- Tests to qualify for normal operation
	- o Long-term aging
		- Thermal
		- Radiation exposure
	- o Mechanical impact
- Test to qualify for design basis events
	- $\circ$  Loss of coolant accident (LOCA) specifically reaction to steam
	- o High energy line break (high temperature or operating pressures)
	- o Fire

The key output from the tests is the availability, for at least a finite duration, to continue operation in order to allow nuclear reactors to be secured safely in the event of a design basis event. As stated in IEEE 383, "(t)ype tests are used primarily to indicate that the cables…can perform under the conditions of a design basis event."

The criterion adopted by IEEE 383 for fire events was a flame spread distance. While it is not the intention to argue the relative merits or exposure conditions resulting from the IEEE 383 fire tests (the IEEE 383-1974 fire tests have been superseded by IEEE 1202 or NFPA 262), the key point to be extracted is the objective of the tests: limit the impact of the fire event and the potential for fire spread along the cabling. While the evaluation does not include a specific circuit integrity or function test, the NFPA 130 requirement called for a minimum short circuit time of five minutes which implied a functional performance (e.g., circuit integrity) requirement when exposed to the IEEE 383 design basis event fire source. It is acknowledged that the short circuit requirement was removed from the 1986 edition of NFPA 130 on the basis that is was "not a currently recognized test procedure" and was thus "vague and difficult to interpret." Nevertheless, the committee substantiation for the change noted an authority having jurisdiction could still utilize a short circuit test of their own definition – with respect to what and how a voltage should be applied and measured. The substantiation noted that NFPA 130 is a "minimum standard", implying that the requirement for a short circuit time was above that minimum. In essence, the committee shifted the burden of identifying a circuit integrity or survivability criteria from the standard to the user/authority having jurisdiction. However, in deleting the short circuit requirement the intent of the requirement shifted subtly from one of functional performance to one only of flame spread.

Therefore, it is proffered that the purpose of referencing IEEE 383 and in incorporating a short circuit requirement was to provide a degree of circuit integrity, analogous to a fire-resistance rated cable pursuant to UL 2196. This is underscored by the applicability of the requirement to "vital train signal circuits and power circuits to emergency fans, lights, etc." Further, the requirement does not necessarily relate to the potential flame spread or production of smoke, rather the application to life safety systems implies a reliability or robustness requirement. This is underscored by the fact that, per previous editions of NFPA 130, an unqualified cable or multiple unqualified cables could be installed directly adjacent to an IEEE 383 qualified cable (all installed in non-combustible conduit pursuant to clause 2-4.1.5. Hence, the requirement for IEEE 383 qualified cables for design basis event fires is not necessarily one specific to flame spread (or smoke production) but of function and performance. The adoption of the fire test of IEEE 383 by the NFPA 130 committee in the development of the original version of the standard for the wire and cable qualification was likely due to the perception that it was a high standard as part of the specification for 1E nuclear certification.

The issue of fire performance – flame spread or fire development and smoke production – was addressed in NFPA 130 through the installation requirements. Specifically, the enclosure of all conductors within "armor sheaths, conduits, or enclosed raceways, boxes, and cabinets". Taken together with the requirement that all such enclosures effectively be non-combustible, the fire performance of the overall cable installation can be taken as represented by the conduit or raceway fire performance requirements. The analog to the conduit requirements can be found in requirements of NFPA 70 for wiring methods in spaces used for environmental air which includes:

*Type MI cable without an overall nonmetallic covering, Type MC cable without an overall nonmetallic covering, Type AC cable, or other factory-assembled multiconductor control or power cable that is specifically listed for use within an air-handling space, or listed prefabricated cable assemblies of metallic manufactured wiring systems without nonmetallic sheath. Other types of cables, conductors, and raceways shall be permitted to be installed in electrical metallic tubing, flexible metallic tubing, intermediate metal conduit, rigid metal conduit without an overall nonmetallic covering, flexible metal conduit, or, where accessible, surface metal raceway or metal wireway with metal covers.*

The importance of conduit and raceway material in addressing cable insulation fire growth and smoke production requirements is underscored by the permissible use of other materials when encased in concrete – which has been carried forward in the 2014 edition of NFPA 130 in Section 12.4.1. This allowance indicates that the combustion properties of conduit are effectively negated if encased in concrete.

Because of the original limited application of IEEE 383 to "vital" circuits (a key distinction that was lost in subsequent revisions of NFPA 130) and the strict requirements for wiring installation requirements within non-combustible conduit or raceway it can be reasonably asserted that neither flame spread nor smoke production requirements were necessary for conductors within enclosed stations or trainways. A flame spread test with a short circuit criterion were imposed for "vital" circuits to allow operation of the safety systems during a "design basis event" on the premise that those were representative of a conductor 'qualified' for a design basis (fire) event for use in nuclear facilities.



location. "Optical fiber" was chosen to be consistent with NFPA 70.








**Statement:** The existing 12.4.4. is split into two sections to separate the requirements for protection from physical damage and protection from fire. The existing list is further divided to separate requirements for tested protection measures as compared to traditional ways of protection such as concrete encasing. This clarifies that fire barriers need to be tested.

> The provisions for redundant circuits and multiple circuits were separated to address and clarify the concept of diversity in system routing.

Annex notes were added to provide a reference for methods involving encasement in concrete and to clarify the intent of redundant circuits using a diagram.

The section on circuits routed outside the enclosed portion of the systems was considered to be an unnecessary requirement therefore removed.





**Committee:** FKT-AAA

**Committee Statement**

**Resolution:** Intent of diversity has been clarified in FR-16 in section 12.4 with the rewrite of the section, the proposed new parenthesis (2) is not necessary.



## **Committee Statement**

**Resolution:** ANSI is removed and UL 263 added in FR17 as it is accepted as an equivalent to ASTM E119











**Statement:** This revision supports other revisions in Chapters 1, 3 and 5 to include requirements for Stops within the scope of the standard

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#### **A.5.3.2.5**

The determination of maximum occupant load at a platform often requires comparison of calculations based on different peak periods. For example, to determine the maximum peak period platform occupant load for stations serving predominantly commuter ridership, the calculations described in 5.3.2.5(1) through 5.3.2.5(7) can be computed based on both the a.m. and the p.m. peak ridership for each platform and then compared to determine the maximum platform occupant load.

The designers and Employers do few a favor when value engineering exit capacity after sinking billions into Metro systems. Designers can use clairevoyance to downsize occupancy and/or exit capacity based on ridership predictions 15 years into the future, or they can apply the logic of: 1) 'if we build it they will come', 2). urban populations are growing, 3). design need consider the increasing embrace sustainable transportation holds for all generations, 4). increasing costs of private transportation, and 5). increasing population. Thus ridership has a clear bias for increase with aging stations. While the locally adopted Building Code may not apply to deep underground stations, the locally adopted Building Code legally works in tandem with NFPA 130 on egress design of shallow, at-grade and elevated stations . The Building Codes literally have millions of building-years of proven performance with their occupancy load tables. The Building Code wisdom bases occupancy on floor capacity, not punditry of passenger density twenty years into the future. A conscientious Employer will design egress capacity based on what many cities find to be an eventuality, fully occupied, even crush-capacity platforms. This platform occupancy load is in place, when loaded train arrives.

### **Additional Proposed Changes**



**Figure 12 Conserved CONSERVERGENCE Proved** toronto\_subway\_2015.jpg platform occupacy is a judgment every responsible stakeholder should weigh in on

**Statement of Problem and Substantiation for Public Input**

problem is pound-wise, penny foolish. We build Metro systems worth tens of billions of euros in 2020, and waste substantial fraction of these sunk costs by value engineering exit capacity to save millions. Millions of euros is a lot of money, and worthy of directing towards causes of merit. But in building safety, exit capacity is a top tier merit. Cut costs on a 2nd standpipe along a fixed-guideway. Cut costs on excessive fire pumps. Cut costs on 3-hour fire separations between rooms of the same occupancy. Cut costs on EXCESSIVE tunnel exit stair shafts But exit capacity on the platform is not an area to be looking to value engineer.

### **Submitter Information Verification**



**Committee:** FKT-AAA

**Committee Statement**

**Resolution:** The concepts suggested in the proposal are already addressed in existing A.5.3.2.1.





#### **A.5.3.2.5(3)**

For purposes of calculating simultaneous occupant loads on center platforms, the intent of 5.3.2.5(3) is that the service disruption factor be applied only in the direction that results in the highest platform occupant load for the peak periods. For side platform stations, it is necessary to evaluate service disruption for both peak periods at each platform, but for simultaneous station evacuation, the principles for center platforms would apply. However, the potential for a service disruption in one direction to cause a service disruption in the other direction should also be considered

Terminus stations require consideration of train operational procedures that may allow for additional trains to be stored during off peak periods to service peak demands, or alternating train arrivals to the different platform edges, and the compounding of missed inbound trains affecting outbound service should be evaluated for its credibility if these scenarios can be mitigated .

It is important that the passenger load and headway capture the potential buildup of passengers that might occur before an emergency event is recognized as requiring evacuation but recognizing that assumptions which exceed the systems service capacity may be remote occurrences that require multiple compounding events which are not credible . The determination of the appropriate accumulation factor should reflect system-specific characteristics such as the following:

- (1) The type of system (e.g., automated/driverless vs. manually driven)
- (2) The amount and type of surveillance
- (3) The distance between stations
- (4) Train headways

For systems with longer headways, a factor of two headways might be adequate to approximate accumulation and response time. For systems with very short headways, a fixed time (e.g., 5 minutes to 10 minutes) might be more appropriate to approximate the potential passenger buildup.

Consideration should also be given to whether the entraining and train loads should be subject to the same accumulation factor.

(1) Service demand operational characteristics

### **Statement of Problem and Substantiation for Public Input**

The proposed revisions are intended to provide futher guidance on the application of the emergency occupant load calcuation methodology for terminus stations and to raise awareness that system service capacity and operational measures require consideration in these specific circumstances. End of line stations (terminus) may/may not have unique circumstances that warrant a different approach to the platform occupant load calcualtions which are not addressed in the current language. The assumptions made should consider how the system is intended to operate and that the assumptions and results are not over inflating the occupant load, specifically for stations with low ridership.

Current language related to missed headways does not providing guidance on how the requirments should be applied and that providng ranges is to ambiguous for the end user. The proposal is to remove this language and to sate a minimum requirment, 2 x headway. If futher conservatism is required that is upon the user or operator. Alternatively, if this is to remain it is suggesed the annex language is more detailed and a rational as to why more than two headways should be considered is provided.

## **Submitter Information Verification**



### **Committee Statement**

#### **Resolution:** FR-75-NFPA 130-2020

**Statement:** The proposed revisions to Annex A are intended to provide clarification on application of the emergency occupant load calculation methodology based on industry experience that suggests the current language does not provide sufficient guidance on how the requirements should be applied. Revisions to A.5.3.2.5 provide better background information regarding the basis of the methodology. Revisions to A.5.3.2.5 (2) and (4) provide guidance for: more effective application of that criteria and the development of associated performance-based variations; application to terminus stations; and awareness that system service capacity and operational measures require consideration in specific circumstances. Revisions to A.5.3.2.5(4) assist in understanding calculations for multi-line platforms.







local standards.

## **Submitter Information Verification**



# **Resolution:** Walkways are designed for managed evacuations under the guidance of authorized trained system employees or other authorized personnel. See A.6.1.2.2.



**Resolution:** FR-44-NFPA 130-2020

**Statement:** Revisions to A.6.3.3.5 and A.6.3.3.8 are to clarify application of guard and handrail requirements. Revisions to annex language are required to more adequately address intended application for conditions that are commonly found in transit system trainways.


















**Resolution:** FR-53-NFPA 130-2020

**Statement:** Added new consideration recognizing the potential effects of on-board fire suppression systems.



**Statement:** Section was created to recognize an alternative approach for estimation of rail vehicle burning rates.

# **Public Input No. 171-NFPA 130-2020 [ Section No. C.1 ]**

#### **C.1** Station **Occupant Load.**

The station platform dimensions are a function of the length of trains served and the train load. Thus the length of a platform at an outlying station might be equal to those of central business district transit stations where the train loads are significantly higher. Consequently, the platform and station occupant loads are a function of the train load and the simultaneous entraining load. This concept differs from that of NFPA *101*, in which the occupant load is determined by dividing the floor area by an occupant load factor assigned to that use. Applying the NFPA *101* approach to determine the station platform occupant load is inappropriate.

#### **C.1.1** Calculating Occupant Load **Ridership .**

Projected ridership figures serve as the basis for determining transit system design. Per this standard, the methodology used to determine ridership figures must also include consider peak ridership figures for new transit systems and existing operating systems. Events , as well as events at stations such as civic centers, sports complexes, and convention centers that establish occupant loads not included in normal passenger loads must also be included. These ridership figures serve as the basis for calculating train and entraining loads and the station occupant load. The methodology used for determining passenger ridership figures can vary by transit system. The use of statistical methods for determining *calculated train loads* and *calculated entraining loads* will provide a more accurate indication of the required means of egress facilities within a station.

C.1.2

## **C.1.2 Train Operations and Maximum Train Load**

Train headways will have a significant effect on the outcome of the occupant load calculations. For example, for the same ridership input, assumed train service of 20 trains per hour (3 minute headways) versus 30 trains per hour (2 minute headways) may increase the calculated platform occupant load by 50%.

The maximum train capacity acts as a "capping" factor when occupant load calculations consider link loads based on ridership. Care should be taken to use a realistic maximum train load that considers number of seats as well as standing capacity based on achievable pedestrian density (where standing is permitted).

#### **C.1.3 Sample Occupant Load Calculations**

The methodology described herein is intended only as examples of how to determine platform and station occupant loads for different station configurations. Inputs such assurge factors and service delays should be carefully considered for each system application, keeping in mind that small changes in those inputs can have a significant effect on the calculations results. Likewise,

## **C.1.3.1 Centre Platform**

## **C.1.3.2 Side Platform**

**C.1.3.3 Multi-line Station**

## **C.2 Calculating Egress Capacity and Evacuation Time**

## **C.2.1 Calculating Evacuation Time.**

The total evacuation time is the sum of the walking travel time for the longest egress route plus the waiting times at the various circulation elements. The trainway can be considered as an auxiliary egress from the station under certain fire scenarios.

The waiting time at each of the various circulation elements is calculated as follows:

- (1) For the platform means of egress, by subtracting the walking travel time on the platform from the platform egress flow time
- (2) For each of the remaining circulation elements, by subtracting the maximum of all previous element flow times

The symbols used in the sample calculations in this annex represent the walking times, flow times, and waiting times as follows:

*T* = total walking travel time for the longest egress route

 $T_p$  = walking travel time on the platform

*TX* = walking travel time for the *X*th segment of the egress route

 $F_p$  = platform egress flow time

*Ffb* = fare barrier flow time

*Fc* = concourse egress flow time

*FN* = flow time for any additional circulation element

*W<sub>p</sub>* = *F<sub>p</sub>* − *T<sub>p</sub>* = waiting time at platform points of egress

*Wfb* =  $F$ *fb* −  $F$ *p* = waiting time at fare barriers

*W<sub>C</sub>* = *F<sub>C</sub>* − max (*F<sub>D</sub>* or *Ff<sub>D</sub>*) = waiting time at concourse points of egress

*WN* = *F<sub>N</sub>* − max (*F<sub>C</sub>*, *Ff<sub>D</sub>*, or *F<sub>D</sub>*) = waiting time at any additional circulation element

Note that the waiting time at any circulation element cannot be less than zero.

**C.** 1.3 **2.2 Sample Egress Capacity and Evacuation Time Calculations**

**C.2.2.1 Center-Platform** Station Sample Calculation. **Station** 

The sample center-platform station is an elevated station with the platform above the concourse, which is at grade *(see Figure C.1.3)*. The platform is 183 m (600 ft) long to accommodate the train length. The vertical distance from the platform to the concourse is 9.1 m (30 ft).

#### **Figure C.1 2 .3 Center 2.1 Center -Platform Station.**



The sample station has one paid area separated from the outside by a fare array containing four electronic fare gates and one 1220 mm (48 in.) handicapped/service gate. In addition, two 1830 mm (72 in.) wide emergency exits are provided. Six open wells communicate between the platform and the concourse. Each well contains one stair or one escalator. Station ancillary spaces are located at the concourse level.

Elevators (not shown in Figure C.1.3) are provided for use by handicapped persons or service personnel. Open emergency stairs are provided at each end of the platform and discharge directly to grade through grille doors with panic hardware.

Escalators are nominal 1220 mm (48 in.) wide. Stairs regularly used by patrons are 1830 mm (72 in.) wide, and emergency stairs are 1220 mm (48 in.) wide. Gates to emergency stairs are 1220 mm (48 in.) wide.

The station occupant load is 2314 persons.

Table C.1.3 lists the data for the egress analysis of the sample center-platform station.

Table C.1.3 Sample Calculations — Center-Platform Station





 $W_c = F_c - \text{max} (F_{fb} \text{ or } F_p)$ 

 $W_C = 0.000 - 3.80 = 0.000$  minutes

Total egress time =  $T + W_p + W_{fb} + W_c$ 

Total egress time = 2.23 + 2.71 + 0.000 + 0.000

Total egress time = 4.94 minutes

In Test No. 2, the time to reach a point outside any enclosing structure is found to be 4.94 minutes. This meets the requirement of 5.3.3.2.

If the concourse of this station is considered to meet the point of safety definition by the authority having jurisdiction, the calculation for Test No. 2 would be modified. The time to reach a point of safety would include the walking travel time from the remote point on the platform to the concourse only, plus the waiting time at the platform points of egress. The area of the concourse would have to be large enough to accommodate the concourse occupant load calculated in Test No. 2.

**C.1 2 .4 2.2 Side-Platform** Station Sample Calculation. **Station** 

The sample side-platform station is an enclosed station with a concourse above the platform level but below grade. *(See Figure C.1.4.)* The platform is 183 m (600 ft) long to accommodate the train length. The vertical distance from grade to concourse is 8 m (26 ft). The concourse is 5.5 m (18 ft) above the platform.

#### **Figure C Figure C .1.4 Side 2.2.2 Side -Platform Station.**



The sample station has two entrances normally used by patrons, each containing one escalator and one stair. The entrances are covered at grade level to a point 3.05 m (10 ft) beyond the top of the stairs.

The concourse is divided into two free areas and one paid area separated by fare arrays. Each fare array contains 12 fare gates of the turnstile type and one swinging service gate, 1220 mm (48 in.) wide, equipped with panic hardware for use by handicapped persons and service personnel.

Three open wells, containing two stairs and one escalator, communicate between each platform and the concourse.

Elevators are provided from grade level to concourse and from the concourse to each platform for use by handicapped persons and service personnel. Station ancillary spaces are located at concourse level.

Enclosed emergency stairs that discharge directly to grade are provided at both ends of each platform. Escalators are nominal 1220 mm (48 in.) wide. Stairs regularly used by patrons are 1830 mm (72 in.) wide. Emergency stairs are 1220 mm (48 in.) wide. Doors to emergency stairs are 1220 mm (48 in.) wide.

The station occupant load is 1600 persons, 228 on the outbound platform and 1372 on the inbound platform.

Table C.1.4 lists the data for the egress analysis of the sample side-platform station.

Table C.1.4 Sample Calculations — Side-Platform Station





\*One escalator discounted *(See 5.3.6.)*

The egress capacity from platform to concourse meets the criteria of 5.3.3.1 in Test No. 1, where the time to clear the platform is found to be 3.38 minutes for the inbound platform and 0.56 minute for the outbound platform.

In Test No. 2, the total egress time (i.e., the maximum egress time for the two paths examined) is found to be 5.85 minutes. This meets the criteria of 5.3.3.2.

Evacuate platform occupant load(s) from platform(s) in 4 minutes or less.

Inbound platform:

**[C.1.4a]** Outbound platform: **[C.1.4b]** *Fp* for inbound and outbound occupant loads satisfies the criterion of 4 minutes. *Test No. 2.* Evacuate platform occupant load from most remote point on platform to a point of safety in 6 minutes or less. Inbound platform: *Wp−i* (waiting time at platform egress elements) = *Fp−i* − *T*1*p−i Wp−i* = 3.38 − 1.33 = 2.05 minutes Concourse occupant load = Platform occupant load - (*Fp−i* × emergency stair capacity) Concourse occupant load = 1372 − 456 = 916 persons Outbound platform: *Wp−o* (waiting time at platform egress elements) = *Fp−o* − *T*1*p−o Wp−o* = 0.56 − 0.49 = 0.07 minute Concourse occupant load = Platform occupant load − (*Fp−o* × emergency stair capacity) Concourse occupant load = 228 − 76 = 152 persons Total concourse occupant load = Concourse load (inbound) + Concourse load (outbound) Total concourse occupant load = 916 – 152 = 1068 persons Concourse: *Wfb* (waiting time at fare barriers) **[C.1.4c]** *Ffb* = 2.96 minutes *Wfb* = *Ffb* − max (*Fp−i* or *Fp−o*) *Wfb* = 2.96 − 3.38 = 0.00 minutes *Wc* (waiting time at concourse egress elements)

 $F_c$ (concourse flow time) =  $\frac{\text{Concourse} \text{ occupancy}}{\text{Concourse} \text{ egress capacity}}$ **[C.1.4d]**  $F_c = \frac{1065}{979}$  $F<sub>C</sub>$  = 3.92 minutes *Wc* = *Fc* − max(*Ffb* or *Fp−i* or *Fp−o*) *W<sub>C</sub>* = 3.92 − 3.38 = 0.54 minutes  $F_c$  = (concourse flow time) =  $\frac{\text{Concourse}\text{ occupancy}}{\text{Concourse}\text{ e}$ Concourse egress capacity **[C.1.4e]**  $F_c = \frac{533}{156}$ Total egress time = max (*Tp−i + Wp−i + or Tp−o + Wp−o) + Wfb + Wc* Total =  $3.26 + 2.05 + 0.00 + 0.54$ Total = 5.85 minutes **C.** 1.5 **2.2.3 Multilevel-Platform Stations.** The procedures for calculating egress times for multilevel platform stations are similar to the sample calculations in C.1.3 and C.1.4. The changes in the egress calculations are for multilevel-platform stations primarily a function of the concurrent occupant load determinations for the two platform levels. The step-by-step procedure relating to the occupant load calculations generally is recommended as follows: (1) Calculate the occupant load for each platform level as in the appropriate examples in C.1.3 and C.1.4 for the same assumed time(s) of day. Refer also to 5.3.2.3(2) and A.5.3.2.3(2). (2) In a multilevel enclosed station, if the fire is on a platform that has routes that egress via another platform, an assumption can be made as to the percentage of occupants who might be expected to evacuate the lower level through the normal egress routes versus the percentage who might be expected to egress via emergency exit stairs. These assumptions will be unique for each system as a function of various parameters, including physical configuration of stations, means of egress, and location of emergency exits; communications facilities to advise passengers, both verbal and signing; level of transit personnel working in stations; and transit personnel emergency procedure responsibilities established for the transit operating authority. (3) The upper-level occupant load is increased by the people evacuating from the lower level through the normal egress routes in accordance with C.1.5(2). (4) For a fire on the lower level, appropriate assumptions relative to the distribution of the occupant loads to the available means of egress are calculated in a fashion similar to the procedures described above.

The remainder of the egress calculations essentially are unchanged from the other sample calculations in C.1.3 and C.1.4.

# **Statement of Problem and Substantiation for Public Input**

NFPA 130 contains sample calculations for egress capacity and evacuation time, but not for occupant load. Given that the intent of NFPA 130 with respect to platform and station occupant load calculations is often misapplied, it is proposed that sample occupant load calculations be added to Appendix C.

The current proposal is intended as a place-holder and should be expanded to include the actual calculations. Additionally, Annex A should be reviewed and revised to eliminate explanatory text that is better addressed in Appendix C, in favour of cross-reference.

## **Submitter Information Verification**



## **Committee Statement**

**Resolution:** FR-73-NFPA 130-2020

**Statement:** NFPA 130 contains guidance and sample calculations for egress capacity and evacuation time, but not for occupant load. Given that the intent of NFPA 130 with respect to platform and station occupant load calculations is often misapplied, this revision expands the information in Annex C related to factors that influence occupant load calculations and adds sample calculations for example purposes.





#### 3.5

The ability to suppress a fire on a rail vehicle at the fire´s incipient stage is essential to reduce the fire growth and control the fire. If approved by the AHJ, the design fire scenario can be reduced as well as the peak heat release rate.

3.6 Design impact on other systems

The use of an on-board fire suppression system may:

- Limit damage to the train, tunnel and the station which it has entered;
- Reduce or eliminate potential use of station sprinklers;
- Significantly reduce the impact of designing for fire emergencies on station architecture;
- Reduce tunnel ventilation capacity requirements
- Reduce the number and/or diameter of emergency ventilation fans required
- Decrease tunnel ventilation shaft and portal areas required
- Reduce the weight of vehicles by eliminating fire barrier doors
- Allow for improved vehicle design with open gangways

## **Statement of Problem and Substantiation for Public Input**

On-board fire suppression system was previously included as annex G to NFPA 130 since the 2014 edition. In the 2020 revision it was intended to merge annex G with annex B. This however resulted in the entirety of annex G being omitted from annex B. The proposed text is based on the original text of the former annex G and now includes fire detection. Both fire detection and fire suppression can provide significant improvement on the fire life safety of rail and transit systems. These systems are already mentioned within the NFPA130 and this annex intends to provide information on aspects of these systems those that are not familiar with them on rail vehicles.

This proposal is the third of 3 alternative proposals:

1 Create a new annex with the proposed text

2 Restore the previous text from annex G from NFPA 130 2014 and 2017 in its entirety to a new annex 3 Add the proposed new text to Annex E Fire Hazard Analysis Process for Vehicle Assessment and **Evaluation** 

For information the following is the original text from Annex G NFPA 130 2014 and 2017:

On-board fire suppression systems (e.g., mist systems), while relatively new in the passenger rail and rail transit fixed guideway industry have been successfully used on a number of passenger rail and diesel powered light rail systems outside of the United States. The applications for this type of system can range from protection of diesel engine compartments to the interior of passenger rail vehicles. The use of a fire suppression system may: save lives in the incident vehicle during a fire condition; minimize damage to the train, tunnel and the station which it has entered; reduce or eliminate potential use of station sprinklers; reduce or eliminate the need for downstands; significantly reduce the impact of designing for fire emergencies on station architecture; reduce tunnel ventilation capacities by approximately 40%; may reduce the number and/or diameter of emergency ventilation fans at each end of each station and within the tunnels, thus reducing structure sizes; decrease shaft airflow cross section areas by approximately 40%; and decrease tunnel ventilation shaft portal areas that correspond to the required fans sizes/velocities. When considering the addition of a fire suppression system, several design challenges should be met by the rail vehicle manufacturer. These challenges include: the type of extinguishing medium used; which all must be approved by the AHJ the size and number of medium canisters and where on the vehicle to place them for easy access for maintenance; the resultant increased energy consumption caused by the increase in weight of the suppression system; the maintenance intervals; the cost of the system; the testing and commissioning of the system; and the cost and difficulties associated with retrofitting vehicle

# **Related Public Inputs for This Document**



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**G.1.2.2** ASHRAE Publications. ASHRAE Inc., 1791 Tullie Circle, NE, Atlanta, GA 30329-2305. *ASHRAE Handbook — Fundamentals* , 2013. *ASHRAE Handbook — Applications* , 2015. *ASHRAE Handbook — Systems and Equipment* , 2012. **G.1.2.3** ASME Publications. ASME Technical Publishing Office, Two Park Avenue, New York NY 10016-5990. ANSI/ASME A17.1, *Safety Code for Elevators and Escalators* , 2013. **G.1.2.4** ASTM Publications. ASTM International, 100 Barr Harbor Drive, P.O. Box C700, West Conshohocken, PA 19428-2959. ASTM D3675, *Standard Test Method for Surface Flammability of Flexible Cellular Materials Using a Radiant Heat Energy Source* , 2017. ASTM E162, *Standard Test Method for Surface Flammability of Materials Using a Radiant Heat Energy Source* , 2016. ASTM E1354, *Standard Test Method for Heat and Visible Smoke Release Rates for Materials and Products Using an Oxygen Consumption Calorimeter* , 2017. ASTM E1537, *Standard Test Method for Fire Testing of Upholstered Furniture* , 2016. ASTM E1590, *Standard Test Method for Fire Testing of Mattresses* , 2017. ASTM E2061, *Standard Guide for Fire Hazard Assessment of Rail Transportation Vehicles* , 2018. **G.1.2.5** – CENELEC Publications. CENELEC, 35, European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardization, CEN-CENELEC Management Centre, Rue de la Science 23, B - 1040, Brussels, Belgium. EN 50124-1, *Railway Applications — Insulation Coordination. Part 1: Basic Requirements — Clearances and Creepage Distances for All Electrical and Electronic Equipment* , 2001, revised 2010. **G.1.2.6** FAA Publications. U.S. Federal Aviation Administration, U.S. Government Publishing Office, Washington, DC 20402. FAR 25.853(c), *Oil Burner Test for Seat Cushions* . **G.1.2.7** – FRA Publications. Federal Railroad Administration, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC 20590. Title 49, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 238, Section 103, *Passenger Equipment Safety Standards* , 2014. **G.1.2.8** – ISO Publications. International Organization for Standardization, ISO Central Secretariat, BIBC II, Chemin de Blandonnet 8, CP 401, 1214 Vernier, Geneva, Switzerland. ISO/DIS 13571, *Life threat from fires — Guidance on the estimation of time available for escape using fire data* , 2006. **G.1.2.9** – NIST Publications. National Institute of Standards and Technology, 100 Bureau Drive, Gaithersburg, MD 20899-1070. NIST IR 4730, *Routine for Analysis of the People Movement Time for Elevator Evacuation* , Klote and Alvord, 1992.

G.1.2.10 - OSHA Publications.

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#### **This new annex expands A .3.2.2 Authority Having Jurisdiction (AHJ)**

#### **1. INTRODUCTION**

This annex suggests recommendations which have been successfully used to to promote cooperation between Fixed Guideway Transit and Passenger Rail Systems- Operator/Owners (known as Rail Agencies (RA)) and those Authority(ies) Having Jurisdiction (AHJ) that have been given the responsibility of ensuring that codes and/or standards are clearly and properly interpreted and enforced.

Many railroad properties pass through multiple city and state jurisdictions; all of which may establish fire and life safety guidance, interpretation's, and enforcement for their local jurisdictions. Given the range of AHJs and their different regulations as well as their conformance to different versions of the same regulations, conflicts will undoubtedly occur in language, interpretations and enforcement. Generally, where direct conflicts exist as they might with federal regulations, these typically supersede state or local regulations including this standard. Where a higher-level authority (i.e. federal government vs. state and local government) exists but where those regulations are silent on regulatory language on the subject matter in question, it becomes acceptable to utilize applicable language of a lowerlevel authority that exists.

To minimize delays and costs, RA's and AHJ's should come to an agreement to apply each jurisdiction's versions of a code and/or standard through an executed Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between associated parties. An MOU is intended to document which codes, and interpretations of codes and standards are to be applied to a specific property and project. The development of this form of joint understanding agreement (MOU) between RA's and AHJ's should be initiated as soon as a project is formulated by the RA so as not to lose time and to move the projects design along expeditiously. Wherever possible an the MOU should be used for every AHJ to minimize changes to the RA.

Although, this standard (NFPA 130) is often written for new railroad properties it is can easily be adapted to modifications and/or additions to existing railroad properties. When new properties are added which pass through multiple jurisdictions, often the regulations between the existing and new jurisdictions will require a thorough review of applicability and acted upon accordingly. NFPA standards, such as this one, have limited legal authority unless it has been otherwise adopted by an enforcement agency, such as state and/or by city legislation. In states, counties, and cities a building or a fire code are often adapted and adopted from International Codes Council by legislation as minimum requirements. In almost all cases, the legislation establishes the AHJ as the entity set to enforce the code and possibly a standard. Most commonly the AHJ achieves its authority by a City, County, State or Federal Authority legislation. Where this standard has not been adopted in total but in part, the standard is generally recognized as a 'best practice or a minimum standard guideline' document which has legal merit.

#### **2. REGULATION CHALLENGES**

What is most beneficial to any project is to establish a "Fire and Life Safety Committee (FLSC)", whose members include, but are not limited to RA's, AHJ's and emergency response officials from the communities served. The FLSC will then agree on the following policies: that all members agree on applicable regulations, the regulation version (adopted or not); identify minimum requirements, provide a process for resolution of conflicts to fire and life safety regulations; identify and resolve gaps in regulations. While at the same time, ensuring all responsible agencies are properly represented that all agreed to regulations are included in SOP's; provide consistent regulations for designers and engineers, and finally to escalate conflicts to policy makers for any issues that cannot be resolved within the FLSC realm.

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#### **2.1 Fire** and Life Safety Committee (FLSC):

The FLSC committee's membership of all affected agencies will help assure that fire/life safety requirements are accounted for in the design, construction, and final operation (revenue service) of the Project/Program. However, due to the sensitive nature and content of the information and decisions that will be shared throughout the course of the Fire Life Safety process, it will be necessary that all members participating in the review of and making recommendations to a projects formulation shall sign a confidentiality agreement. The Fire/Life Safety Committee will be the reviewing committee for fire/life safety considerations in a projects' design and construction operations and shall assist in the development of the emergency preparedness plan, including a response and operational requirements program. Note the FLSC does not have authority over AHJ's but provides a forum to resolve conflicts through discussion.

#### **2.2 CoordinaƟng MulƟple Agency Responses**

The FLSC also provides a forum to integrate emergency response agencies activities. Often the Fire Department is the regulatory AHJ, therefore fire department participation is simplified as this often includes response for fire, medical, rescue emergencies. However, other emergency response agencies (law enforcement, ambulance, RA, utilities, etc.) should be included in all relevant discussions and decisions. This inclusion could be significant when rail properties extend through multiple law enforcement and utility agency jurisdictions.

#### **2.3 FLSC Structure**

**2.3.1** The RA normally assigns their Chief Safety Officer as the FLSC committee 'chairperson' who invites all AHJ representatives and develops the FLSC structure. The chairperson has the responsibility for ensuring that the FLSC includes members from all associated fire and life safety agencies.

**2.3.2** Where AHJs choose not to participate it is necessary for them to provide to the FLSC chairperson a officially signed document stating their non-participation in the project so that they cannot return at a later date to request changes to the project, unless they, again in writing, request reinstatement on the project. This should specify if they will apply their authority on a project. In another case, some AHJ's may choose to opt out of exerting their authority for small, relatively insignificant, or low impact projects, or may defer to another AHJ.

**2.3.3** The FLSC is normally comprised of AHJ's, state safety oversight's (SSO), first responder organizations and recognized international enforcement bodies as many may reference this standard as it is adopted rule. There may also be in some cases that a rail agency becomes its own Authority Having Jurisdiction. It is imperative in this case that they follow local codes and standards as a way of ensuring compliance with state and local laws.

**2.3.4** With the help of the FLSC chairperson along with the approval of the RA operator, group members shall prepare and issue a charter for the committee members that establishes its scope, establish clearly defined roles and responsibilities of its members establish methods for the conflict resolution processes, and membership status for its members (voting and novoting). The FLSC must finally establish the governing rules for a quorum so that all member can vote on all issues.

**2.3.5** Representatives that are assigned to the FLSC should attend throughout the project's duration. Should that not be possible, each representative member agency should, in the early stages of the project designate alternates. . Committee membership alternates should attend all meetings. Given distances between AHJ offices, tele-meetings may be most effective method of maintaining meeting dates and times.

**2.3.7** Minutes of meeƟngs and shared documents should be provided to all parƟcipaƟng agencies. An RA managed secure internet site should be maintained with authorized access to committee members, alternates, and their supervisors. It is important to present preliminary designs of the project so that members can have a visual understanding of what the project entails, including but not limited to current and planned track and station alignments corresponding to jurisdictions crossed.

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**2.3.8** Once FLSC team members and their alternates have been set, establish a work plan and schedule for future meetings. For new properties and/or new AHJ representative participation to an existing FLSC, it will be necessary to explain the overall project scope, schedule, available RA resources, known AHJ regulations and fire and life safety systems/concerns should be provided.

**2.3.9** For more complex RA properties with simultaneously occurring and potentially interfacing projects a sub committees to the FLSC would be advisable to address local project issues. Results from the local project FLSC should be addressed at the full FLSC to integrate the findings across all projects.

#### **2.4 FLSC Resources**

The FLSC should consider both internal and external resources, starting with this standard, other regulations, guidelines, other rail properties documents and publications to assist in resolving conflicts.

RA experts (designers), such as Fire Protection Engineers, Architects, Traction Power Specialists, Track Engineers, Mechanical Engineers, tunnel operators, etc. are essential resources to have attend specific meetings to provide technical advice to AHJs needed to inform AHJs and other RA members.

As the project progresses from initial planning through the various other stages of design and construction, the committee should meet with designers and contractors to formulate best methods for producing a safe and reliable rail station/tunnels, etc. On the train orientation meetings will usually be required.

FLSC Subcommittees or task groups should be considered for specific issues. They can investigate possible solutions, prepare materials and recommendations for the full FLSC.

Site visits by FLSC members should be arranged to provide a firsthand understanding of the challenges and discuss resolutions applied resulting from committee discussions and voting.

#### **2.5 Conflicts**

FLSC members should identify regulation conflicts at the earliest time in the projects' formulation as possible and forward them to the FLSC chairperson for dissemination to all members. Once identified, whether they be code conflict(s) (or gaps, i.e. where regulations do not provide clear guidance), the committee should identify a method to identify regulation intent and a documented process to resolve conflicts or provide agreed clarification. The resolution should be distributed to affected AHJs and included in design guide, if available.

**2.6 Level of Compliance** ‐ The RA should assume that they will adopt the most stringent applicable language, or, adopt less stringent code/standards along with necessary supporting documentation as to why a less stringent code/standard was adopted in each case; ConsulƟng legal advice is advisable prior to any adopƟon. *For example, if this standard has been adopted as the design and construcƟon guideline, but does not address specific circumstances, c language should be considered to address requirements from other building and fire codes whichever is applicable.*

**2.7 Lead Agency** - As any number of railroad properties pass-through multiple jurisdictions, all with different representative values and regulations it may be advisable to to select one as the lead agency representing the project and, and based on the size and complexity of the project, it may be appropriate to establish lead jurisdictions for each critical secƟon/element. *E.g. For a major tunnel that connected into New York, all Fire Departments involved opted to have New York City Fire Department as the lead because of its size and* expertise; for State Safety Oversight (SSO), with both NY and NJ as the two states involved, NJ *SSO became the lead.*

**2.8 Design Guide or Technical Requirements** ‐ Are created to document operaƟng facility requirements that will be addressed while developing the design of a specific project. The document assembles design elements such as: architectural guidelines; mechanical guidelines; fire and life safety guidelines and depending on the involvement of multiple jurisdictions the document becomes of the utmost importance.

Specifically, this document, as it relates to all applicable fire and life safety regulations along with the inclusion of modified by local ordinances as jointly agreed to by the AHJs and RA should be established as soon as practical. In some cases, to reduce the extensive review of multiple, potentially conflicting regulations, a Fire and Life Safety design guide has been developed. This would include related excerpts from the regulations, along with resolutions to conflicts' and language to fill regulation gaps. This document allows designers a common ground to ensure their design will meet the RA project fire and life safety requirements. This becomes the basis for design work on any projects relative to fire and life safety, for example RA stations

Although using a single edition design guide for the life of the RA is desirable to ensure all fire and life safety systems are the same, this is not usually possible as fire and life safety regulations which affect applicability, testing and maintenance can change as regulations are revised, and projects can be extended or new projects added into a time period when new regulations are adopted. The design guide should be reviewed, conflicts and changes to requirements updated and approved and a revised version of the design guide issued.

For small changes in regulations, rather than issue an entirely new design guide, a process for documenting distribution and receipt of agreed changes should be established as appendix language in design guide . For example, there are occasionally Temporary Interim Agreements (TIA) which are issued procedurally by the NFPA to correct a standard at the request of the Technical Committee.

The design guide, once approved by the AHJ should not be changed for the specific project under which the design guide was approved, i.e. unless serious problems with the adopted version of a regulation occur.

If local changes to the design guide are necessary, a document expressly identifying why the change is necessary, identifying the sections of the applicable regulations, the intent, and be signed by affected parties. This document has been referred to as a Letter of Concurrence, or LOC.

Although a FLSC approved design guide is available, this does not supersede specific language in applicable regulations, nor does the presence of a design guide limit the authority vested in their regulations of the AHJ to make retroactive changes if deemed necessary.

#### **3. EMERGENCY OPERATIONS PLANNING, TRAINING**

The FLSC provides a logical venue to develop interagency training for RA, notably the Operations Control Center (OCC), and responding agencies. Since not all responders are from fire jurisdictions, other agencies should be included in planning and training. For larger rail properties a FLSC a standing subcommittee on training is often used. Since all agencies, including RA are required to comply with National Incident Management System federal

requirements, the command structure of response is already defined. Specific training is required of the RA for responding agencies and this standard.

Given the potential for large scale mass casualty incidents with several jurisdictions responding, the FLSC is a logical location to develop, and coordinate required drills, tabletops, exercises, etc. to meet federal commissioning requirements typically included in funding packages. This is specifically applicable where multiple agencies will respond, i.e. fire department, law enforcement, RA, utilities such as power, local municipalities, etc.

Training includes pre‐opening, as well as ongoing training and training when changes are made which might impact emergency responders and RA. Training types are identified in Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (1) and includes, seminars, drills, tabletops, functional and large-scale exercises.

# **Statement of Problem and Substantiation for Public Input**

NFPA has no guidance on the relationships between NFPA 130 Standard for Fixed Guideway Transit and Passenger Rail Systems and the the Authorities Having Jurisdiction. The proposed annex becomes Annex G and current Annex G becomes Annex H. Proposed annex submitted by Harold Levitt, member emeritus and Gary English, former AHJ. Following suggestions in this annex can streamline design, construction processes for new properties and property retrofits which will save time and money. Suggestions are made based on proven practices.

## **Submitter Information Verification**

**Submitter Full Name:** Gary English



## **Committee Statement**

**Resolution:** FR-52-NFPA 130-2020

**Statement:** Annex G Statement: Adds current information to the standard to provide guidance for on board fire protection systems for vehicles.

> Annex H Statement: NFPA has no guidance on the relationships between NFPA 130 Standard for Fixed Guideway Transit and Passenger Rail Systems and the Authorities Having Jurisdiction. The Annex G is added to recommend a process for establishing the roles and responsibilities of the AHJ, rail authority and the designer.





sharply reduce the heat release rate of a fire and prevent its growth.

- (7) 3.4 Tenable environment
- $(8)$  The tenability of the environment within a rail vehicle immediately after a fire has started until the vehicle is able to come to a safe stopping place where the occupants can egress the vehicle can be significantly improved with an on-board fire suppression system. Such systems typically improve thermal conditions in proximity to the fire, reduce the rate of smoke generation and its rate of spreading to other areas as well as keeping carbon monoxide levels well below critical levels.

3.5

The ability to suppress a fire on a rail vehicle at the fire's incipient stage is essential to reduce the fire growth and control the fire. If approved by the AHJ, the design fire scenario can be reduced as well as the peak heat release rate.

3.6 Design impact on other systems

The use of an on-board fire suppression system may:

- Limit damage to the train, tunnel and the station which it has entered;
- Reduce or eliminate potential use of station sprinklers;
- Significantly reduce the impact of designing for fire emergencies on station architecture;
- Reduce tunnel ventilation capacity requirements
- Reduce the number and/or diameter of emergency ventilation fans required
- Decrease tunnel ventilation shaft and portal areas required
- Reduce the weight of vehicles by eliminating fire barrier doors
- Allow for improved vehicle design with open gangways

# **Statement of Problem and Substantiation for Public Input**

On-board fire suppression system was previously included as annex G to NFPA 130 since the 2014 edition. In the 2020 revision it was intended to merge annex G with annex B. This however resulted in the entirety of annex G being omitted from annex B. The proposed text is based on the original text of the former annex G and now includes fire detection. Both fire detection and fire suppression can provide significant improvement on the fire life safety of rail and transit systems. These systems are already mentioned within the NFPA130 and this annex intends to provide information on aspects of these systems those that are not familiar with them on rail vehicles.

This proposal is the first of 3 alternative proposals:

1 Create a new annex with the proposed text

2 Restore the previous text from annex G from NFPA 130 2014 and 2017 in its entirety to a new annex 3 Add the proposed new text to Annex E Fire Hazard Analysis Process for Vehicle Assessment and **Evaluation** 

For information the following is the original text from Annex G NFPA 130 2014 and 2017:

On-board fire suppression systems (e.g., mist systems), while relatively new in the passenger rail and rail transit fixed guideway industry have been successfully used on a number of passenger rail and diesel powered light rail systems outside of the United States. The applications for this type of system can range from protection of diesel engine compartments to the interior of passenger rail vehicles. The use of a fire suppression system may: save lives in the incident vehicle during a fire condition; minimize damage to the train, tunnel and the station which it has entered; reduce or eliminate potential use of station sprinklers; reduce or eliminate the need for downstands; significantly reduce the impact of designing for fire emergencies on station architecture; reduce tunnel ventilation capacities by approximately 40%; may reduce the number and/or diameter of emergency ventilation fans at each

**Relationship Alternative Alternative** 

end of each station and within the tunnels, thus reducing structure sizes; decrease shaft airflow cross section areas by approximately 40%; and decrease tunnel ventilation shaft portal areas that correspond to the required fans sizes/velocities. When considering the addition of a fire suppression system, several design challenges should be met by the rail vehicle manufacturer. These challenges include: the type of extinguishing medium used; which all must be approved by the AHJ the size and number of medium canisters and where on the vehicle to place them for easy access for maintenance; the resultant increased energy consumption caused by the increase in weight of the suppression system; the maintenance intervals; the cost of the system; the testing and commissioning of the system; and the cost and difficulties associated with retrofitting vehicle

# **Related Public Inputs for This Document**



# **Submitter Information Verification**



## **Committee Statement**

**Resolution:** FR-52-NFPA 130-2020

**Statement:** Annex G Statement: Adds current information to the standard to provide guidance for on board fire protection systems for vehicles.

> Annex H Statement: NFPA has no guidance on the relationships between NFPA 130 Standard for Fixed Guideway Transit and Passenger Rail Systems and the Authorities Having Jurisdiction. The Annex G is added to recommend a process for establishing the roles and responsibilities of the AHJ, rail authority and the designer.
# **Public Input No. 69-NFPA 130-2020 [ New Section after G.3 ]**

#### **New Annex**

#### On-board fire suppression systems

On-board fire suppression systems (e.g., mist systems), while relatively new in the passenger rail and rail transit fixed guideway industry have been successfully used on a number of passenger rail and diesel powered light rail systems outside of the United States. The applications for this type of system can range from protection of diesel engine compartments to the interior of passenger rail vehicles. The use of a fire suppression system may: save lives in the incident vehicle during a fire condition; minimize damage to the train, tunnel and the station which it has entered; reduce or eliminate potential use of station sprinklers; reduce or eliminate the need for downstands; significantly reduce the impact of designing for fire emergencies on station architecture; reduce tunnel ventilation capacities by approximately 40%; may reduce the number and/or diameter of emergency ventilation fans at each end of each station and within the tunnels, thus reducing structure sizes; decrease shaft airflow cross section areas by approximately 40%; and decrease tunnel ventilation shaft portal areas that correspond to the required fans sizes/velocities. When considering the addition of a fire suppression system, several design challenges should be met by the rail vehicle manufacturer. These challenges include: the type of extinguishing medium used; which all must be approved by the AHJ the size and number of medium canisters and where on the vehicle to place them for easy access for maintenance; the resultant increased energy consumption caused by the increase in weight of the suppression system; the maintenance intervals; the cost of the system; the testing and commissioning of the system; and the cost and difficulties associated with retrofitting vehicles

# **Statement of Problem and Substantiation for Public Input**

On-board fire suppression system was previously included as annex G to NFPA 130 since the 2014 edition. In the 2020 revision it was intended to merge annex G with annex B. This however resulted in the entirety of annex G being omitted from annex B. The proposed text is based on the original text of the former annex G and now includes fire detection. Both fire detection and fire suppression can provide significant improvement on the fire life safety of rail and transit systems. These systems are already mentioned within the NFPA130 and this annex intends to provide information on aspects of these systems those that are not familiar with them on rail vehicles.

This proposal is the second of 3 alternative proposals:

1 Create a new annex with the proposed text

2 Restore the previous text from annex G from NFPA 130 2014 and 2017 in its entirety to a new annex 3 Add the proposed new text to Annex E Fire Hazard Analysis Process for Vehicle Assessment and **Evaluation** 

### **Related Public Inputs for This Document**

**Related Input Relationship** 

Public Input No. 67-NFPA 130-2020 [New Section after G.3] Alternative Public Input No. 70-NFPA 130-2020 [New Section after E.3.4] Alternative

## **Submitter Information Verification**

**Submitter Full Name:** Jonathan Redding **Organization:** FOGTEC Fire Protection

**Street Address: City: State: Zip: Submittal Date:** Fri Jun 26 08:27:10 EDT 2020 **Committee:** FKT-AAA

# **Committee Statement**

**Resolution:** New annex was added to address on board fire protection systems for vehicles.